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With the Federal election looming, now is the perfect time to 
be examining what is needed from our political leaders in the 
next term of government to deliver the long term vision and 
reforms Australia needs to ensure its economic prosperity for 
future generations.
CEDA has undertaken this research report because whoever 
leads Australia following the Federal election, it is vital that 
there is a commitment and return to long term reform of the type Australia has 
enjoyed under past leaders and that significantly contributed to our robust 
economy and society today.
Australia has the economic fundamentals to underpin continued economic expan-
sion for another decade or more, but for this to be achieved first and foremost we 
need strong leaders prepared to make the tough decisions and lead rather than 
be caught up in the 24 hour media cycle and headline politics.
It is often said that 20-20 hindsight is perfect vision and in this publication CEDA 
has sought to adopt a retrospective view of how significant reforms were under-
taken by past governments at Federal and State level, and to extrapolate what 
were the key features that underpinned their success.
Foreword
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The first two chapters, by Geoff Allen AM and Michael Stutchbury, and Professor 
Greg Smith, examine styles of leadership and reform models.  
They highlight that there is not one leadership style or model that provides a silver 
bullet for success in implementing reform, but key areas identified to improve the 
chances of success include having a strong long term vision, engaging experts, 
setting down strong foundations, and building support before implementing that 
vision.
The third chapter provides a good example of where Australia, with the right 
policies, could leverage significant economic growth through the expansion and 
export of agricultural goods from northern Australia to our Asian neighbours.
Significantly, to highlight many of the successful reforms pursued by Australia’s 
leaders in the past,  this publication also includes excerpts of interviews con-
ducted with former prime ministers, the Hon. Bob Hawke AC GCL and the Hon. 
John Howard OM AC SSI; former state premiers, the Hon. Nick Greiner AC, the 
Hon. Jeff Kennett AC and the Hon. Steve Bracks AC; and some of our country’s 
former most senior public servants, Dr Allan Hawke AC, Dr Ken Henry AC and 
Terry Moran AC.
CEDA is extremely grateful and privileged to have the support for this publication 
from people of this calibre through these candid interviews. 
All these leaders have driven significant reform agendas, as politicians or heads 
of government departments, and these pieces provide insight into their personal 
experiences in shaping reform. In addition they also provide insight into what is 
missing in the current debate.
I would like to thank the contributing authors and interviewees for their time and 
contribution to this piece. I hope current and future leaders find this a valuable 
and insightful publication.
Professor the Hon. Stephen Martin 
Chief Executive 
CEDA
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Australia’s two-decade economic expansion has not been simply a function of 
chance or benefiting from the nation’s rich natural endowments. This historic 
growth period has occurred despite the Asian Financial Crisis; the Russian and 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crises; the 2001 bursting of the technol-
ogy bubble; the quintupling of oil prices; the global financial crisis and subsequent 
deep recession in advanced economies; and the ongoing European sovereign 
debt crisis. Success has been enabled by public policy settings that have encour-
aged flexibility, efficient resource allocation and innovation in the economy. 
There is widespread belief among CEDA members that Australia’s recent policy 
making has not been at a best practice standard. Some reasons that have been 
given for the presumed decline in quality of public policy debate and execution 
are: 
A heightened emphasis within governments on opinion polls and responding to •	
perceived popular opinion; 
Changes in the media landscape and its influence on public information; and•	
Issues in the relationship between the public service and politicians. •	
While these issues have not stopped important policy development, such as the 
Henry Tax Review or the white paper on Australia in the Asian Century, many of 
the reforms put forward have been considered too difficult or politically unpal-
atable for government to pursue. The major exception is the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme, now DisabilityCare Australia. However, despite wide commu-
nity and bipartisan political support for the initiative, contentious issues associated 
with its ongoing funding have proven intractable. 
It is vital that Australia rediscovers its ability to clearly identify and implement 
challenging economic reforms. As the stimulus from the mining boom fades, 
Australia’s prosperity will become increasingly subject to the pressures of the 
international marketplace. This will occur in an environment of heightened human 
and financial capital mobility and fast paced technological advances that can 
rapidly undermine sources of traditional comparative advantage. Whether recent 
economic success fades into memory or continues will be substantially deter-
mined by the quality of policy implemented by government. 
Contributions and interviewees 
In a democracy you get the quality of government you deserve (or vote for) not 
what you might (subsequently) desire. 
To illustrate what the essence of good policy making should reflect and processes 
involved, CEDA has sought to distil the experience of successful politicians and 
public servants and examined the characteristics of political models that have 
introduced meaningful economic reforms.  A case study of northern Australia 
explores the opportunities and challenges that Australia must confront to con-
tinue to prosper. 
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In Politics and leadership styles, Geoff Allen AM, CEDA’s National Chairman, and 
Michael Stutchbury, Editor-in-chief of the Australian Financial Review, examine a 
range of political leadership models that have been associated with successfully 
introducing economic reform in Australia. They reflect on the characteristics of 
different political leadership styles, such as consensus, leadership and advocacy 
and the circumstances in which they are most suitable. 
In Economic policy reform as successful change leadership, Greg Smith, 
Adjunct Professor Australian Catholic University, Chairman of the Commonwealth 
Grants Commission and Senior Fellow Melbourne Law School, discusses the 
similarities between economic reform and the organisational change management 
process. He focuses on the stages of creating urgency, forming a powerful coali-
tion, creating a vision for change and communicating that vision. Smith articulates 
how the growing complexity of reforms has made establishing an effective change 
leadership framework itself an urgent requirement.  
In Challenges for northern Australia, David Farley, former Managing Director 
and Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Agricultural Company, describes the 
reform efforts required to capitalise on growing international demand for food. 
He notes that demographic and economic growth could potentially deliver a sig-
nificant shift in the agricultural terms of trade, providing a significant stimulus for 
Australia. However, without a concerted effort to address structural challenges 
through appropriate policy initiatives, Australia will fail to achieve its potential as a 
food bowl to Asia. 
To complement these contributions, a number of reformist former politicians and 
public servants were interviewed for this publication. Contributions included are 
from former prime ministers the Hon. Bob Hawke AC GCL and the Hon. John 
Howard OM AC SSI; former premiers the Hon. Nick Greiner AC (NSW), the Hon. 
Jeff Kennett AC (Victoria) and the Hon. Steve Bracks AC (Victoria). Senior former 
public servants interviewed were Dr Ken Henry AC, Terry Moran AC, and Dr Allan 
Hawke AC. 
Model leadership 
Past successful economic reform in Australia has been aided substantially by 
strong political leadership. While the changing media landscape – social media, 
24/7 news cycles and the like – is making it more difficult to develop and promote 
a reform agenda, current failings in the public policy debate are increasingly attrib-
utable to the failure of individual political skills that inhibit true leadership. 
What are the characteristics of leadership that most influence economic reform?
Bob Hawke described the failure on both sides of politics to lead rather than to 
follow public opinion as a major character flaw in modern Australian politics.
“ I think there is an increasing tendency to, if not be governed, certainly to be influ-
enced in approaches by opinion polls. And I find this basically repugnant because 
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leadership is about leading, not following, and that doesn’t mean you don’t listen 
to what’s being said, but I think leaders have a responsibility to shape public 
understanding.” 
Hawke’s view was broadly shared by the senior public servants interviewed. Ken 
Henry described how the best leaders he had worked with liked to be just in front 
of where they believed public opinion could be moved.  
“ The principal role is, though, for the leader to identify where the challenges are for 
the country, to articulate a strategic approach to addressing those challenges, and 
to put that to the public, and to convince the public that that is indeed the way that 
the country should move, rather than simply sit back and attend to issues on a day 
to day basis…So, a leader who is preoccupied with following public opinion is, of 
course, not really going to offer any leadership at all.” 
The views on leadership expressed in the contributions and interviews in this 
report are very different from the ‘great man theory’ of history.1 As Geoff Allen 
and Michael Stutchbury describe, while successful reformist leaders have had 
common characteristics, a key element of successful leadership was identified as 
having a very strong set of cohesive values or an overriding philosophy that deter-
mines the overall direction that they want to take the state or nation. In contrast, 
politicians focused simply on winning and retaining power fail to achieve the con-
sistency required to introduce and successfully prosecute meaningful economic 
reforms. 
John Howard reflected on the tension between values and political advantage.
“ In politics, you need to be in government to implement things. The phrase I used 
often is ‘it is better to be 80 per cent pure in government than 125 per cent pure in 
opposition’.”
“ I used 80 per cent very deliberately. You had to maintain the central features of good 
policy. You have to compromise at the edges to get it through. 
“ There’s a tension between values and ideology on the one hand, and political advan-
tage on the other. It’s always been there and the successful government achieves 
both.” 
Another characteristic of successful leadership is the requirement for careful 
preparation by government for introducing reforms. Even when major changes 
are introduced in a short period of time, such as the case of Roger Douglas in 
New Zealand (the famous Rogernomics) or Jeff Kennett in Victoria, they occurred 
due to careful and detailed policy work. Jeff Kennett described this process: 
“ From when I was elevated to the leadership in ’82, we kept reviewing our policies.  
Every time we lost an election we kept refreshing those policies. The situation kept 
getting worse economically, so we knew well before the election we had a chance 
of winning finally in ’92.
“ I think the public needs to know where you want to end up.”  
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This approach contrasts with “policies introduced as thought bubbles on the run, 
to give the impression of activism or to resolve a short term political problem”.2  
A further requirement for effective leadership involves meaningful communication 
and consultation, although stakeholder significance can differ according to the 
view of the individual leader. What is critical is that, as noted by Terry Moran, the 
art of governing is successfully practiced. 
“ It comes from political leaders who know what they’re doing. Australia’s actually had 
a number of really effective political leaders in the last 20 years, both at a national 
level and in a number of the states. They all did it differently and they all did it 
towards different ends, in a sense. But they all knew the art of governing, which is 
partly about what public policy is, how you develop it and how you make it work. But 
it’s also partly about how you lead in the context of community and media under-
standing, set direction for the government and how you make it all come together to 
deliver results on the day. That’s the art of governing.”
It can be concluded that while the specifics may vary, convictions, internal and 
external engagement, good internal process management and effective commu-
nication skills are prerequisites for model leadership in Australia. 
Effective reform management
The economic reforms that Australia will need to introduce to sustain its economic 
fundamentals in a global environment will involve major change, transforming or 
even replacing existing ways of doing things and finding completely new solu-
tions to old problems. Anything less will not position the country to optimise its 
prosperity in the highly competitive global economy. This will require both effec-
tive leadership and an understanding of how to introduce reforms in Australia’s 
complex social democracy.
Nick Greiner observed that while there were substantial differences between intro-
ducing change in a corporate environment and in the public policy context it does 
provide a more scientific approach to examining successful economic reforms. 
Historically, the discussion of successful reform initiatives often focuses on one 
or two key points or moments and often fails to appreciate the considerable work 
that is involved in introducing and prosecuting reforms. 
Greg Smith has outlined the key stages that are vital for governments to manage 
if a reform is to be successfully introduced and to survive. They include: 
Creating a sense of urgency•	  about the need to introduce the change. This 
includes developing the internal political will to introduce and support reform as 
well as the broad-based community acknowledgement of the need to change. 
As an example, Bob Hawke credited the Economic Summit as a successful 
mechanism for developing widespread community understanding of Australia’s 
need for change; 
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Forming a coalition•	  of interests that support the change. This was noted by a 
number of interviewees as being the critical ingredient of almost all successful 
reforms. For instance, John Howard acknowledged the support of the business 
community and the Australian Council of Social Services for a GST as beneficial 
in introducing the new tax system; 
Develop the change vision.•	  This involves more than describing the outcomes 
of the reform but, as Nick Greiner states, involves describing why the reform 
is necessary. For instance, tax reform is important not just for the extra dollars 
it may provide to someone’s pay-packet, but because it will help develop a 
dynamic and vibrant economy; 
Communicating the change vision•	 . This involves establishing key narratives that 
link to a cohesive vision for Australia. Terry Moran describes this skill as one of 
the fundamental capabilities of a government and important for bringing people 
along with any change – something that is vital in a democracy like Australia; 
Empower others to act•	 . Any change will result in winners and losers, with those 
that miss out often being easily identifiable and more vocal in their opposition 
than the beneficiaries of the change. Greg Smith identifies the critical bridging 
role the public service provides between political decision-making and the wider 
engagement in reforms by the community. For instance, the Tax Office made 
large capacity investments in systems and guidance provision to make sure 
the private sector could introduce the GST. After all, every economic reform is 
ultimately enacted by the private sector.  
In the corporate environment, often critical steps in reform management are 
ignored or not thoroughly prosecuted. As a consequence, a large number of 
change management programs in the corporate sector have historically failed.3 
While understanding the change management process is helping improve the 
odds of success, the task is even more daunting for governments that lack the 
time and political resources to prosecute reforms over the same timeframes. 
Geoff Allen and Michael Stutchbury note that a common characteristic of effective 
reformist politicians has been good internal process management to develop and 
prosecute proposals. This will either be through effective use of cabinet protocols, 
to get internal support for proposals or to test ideas, or through successfully mar-
shalling of the professional capabilities of the public service. Introducing economic 
reforms in the future will require an effective reform management model, and an 
engaged public service, for it to be successful. This could be challenging given 
the changing nature of the relationship between the government and the public 
service. 
According to Allan Hawke:
“ …the elephant in the room is the rise in the numbers and the influence of the private 
office compared to the public service over this period. Particular ministers have said 
from time to time, ‘we don’t need the department to generate policy ideas, we will 
do that ourselves’. The public service is simply there to implement and execute the 
decisions of the government of the day.”
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Terry Moran described the situation as: 
“ Until the end of the Howard Government, a minister’s office would be a mixture of 
seconded senior public servants who knew about the business of government and 
also public policy, as well as experienced political and media advisors. In recent 
years we have come to accept, without comment, a system with hardly any senior 
public servants in ministerial offices. Thus ministers often lack, close at hand, com-
patible professional people with the background to help them deal with the business 
of government and public policy. This means a lot of the load has often fallen to 
people with no experience or insufficient experience of actually being in government, 
rather than handling media relations or managing stakeholders in a political sense. 
There have been a lot of miscalculations along the way.
“ It’s not just a Canberra problem nor do these comments apply to all ministers.  But 
the conventions and understandings about the role of ministerial advisors and how 
they should behave have decayed.  Perhaps the consequence of all this is that 
governments will be destined to relatively short terms because they display gaps in 
the broad skills of governing.” 
This reflects a significant change from the relationship that successful reformist 
politicians were able to cultivate with the public service. While they may have had 
different approaches to achieving it, each politician who successfully prosecuted 
reforms stated that the Australian public service delivered highly professional 
assistance in executing, and also in helping develop, policy proposals. 
A lack of engagement with the public service will effectively stifle any govern-
ment’s ability to develop and prosecute reforms. According to Steve Bracks: 
“ In government you had to replenish policy by using the apparatus of government to 
do it. The whole government is a tool available to do it. Now my view is that tool is 
often underutilised. 
“ I saw the longevity of our Government being dependent on using that apparatus 
of government to develop good policy. That is why effectively, I replaced the work 
we did in opposition with interest groups and stakeholders and the party apparatus 
with a structured approach (that involved formal processes for engaging the public 
service capabilities).” 
Jeff Kennett described his relationship within his party and with the public service 
as: 
“ It was a lesson I learnt in my army days. You can have the best general on the field, 
but if he doesn’t have troops under him and they don’t have a good relationship and 
they don’t work together, you can’t win anything. So no one on their own wins. A 
premier doesn’t win alone, the leader of a football club, a player, a not-for-profit, no 
one on their own delivers – only teams deliver.”
John Howard described the importance of leadership in forming these effective 
relationships as: 
“ The relationship between the leader and the immediately led is very important in 
the political environment, as it is in a military environment. This idea that you can do 
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these things almost in isolation is nonsense. You have to take people immediately 
around you with you.
“ You need, obviously, to have the support of the public, the professional public 
service. You shouldn’t underestimate that. I don’t believe in governments being run 
by the public service, but you can’t run a government without the public service.
“And having a good relationship between the government of the day and the public 
service is very important.” 
Without that relationship it is not possible to effectively introduce economic 
reforms. Terry Moran observed that: 
“ Government is now so complex that no minister can have the technical ability or 
insight to, for instance, by themselves come up with a big tax reform package. 
These things are so complex that they need the professional advice of the public 
service.” 
Bob Hawke recognised this when he observed that issues may have grown more 
complex, but knowledge has increased as well. Too effectively implement complex 
economic reforms requires a strong and professional relationship between the 
public service and politicians. 
A changing media landscape
Australia has a relatively good recent track record at addressing difficult economic 
issues and implementing tough reforms that set the basis for the current period of 
economic expansion. During the 1990s the main contribution to gross domestic 
income (GDI) per capita was productivity growth, which contributed 60 per cent 
of the total improvement experienced over the decade and was due to difficult 
reforms introduced earlier. However, during the 2000s the key driver of GDI per 
capita was capital accumulation, which added half of all improvement to GDI per 
capita. In contrast, productivity growth added just 3.5 per cent to GDI per capita. 
A portion of Australia’s decline in productivity growth is no doubt related to the sig-
nificant upswing in investment in the resources sector. However, it does highlight 
the importance of addressing the fundamental economic challenges confronting 
Australia, including a return to the successful economic reforms that will drive 
future productivity improvements. 
Australia is not suffering from a surfeit of reform opportunities. What seems to be 
lacking is the political will or skill to grapple with contested issues of economic 
reform. Nick Greiner observed that this situation is not unique to Australia but has 
strong parallels with all democracies with which Australia might compare itself. 
While not a consensus view, the majority of politicians and public servants 
believed a change in the nature of the media, in particular its pervasiveness and 
capacity to harness opposition to proposals, was the major reason for the decline 
in the public debate. Nick Greiner described the media’s influence as: 
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“ Everything’s more immediate, so you tend to get issues cut off.  Because of the 
nature of the media cycle, the advice of media minders is, you’ve got to kill it imme-
diately…So whether it’s a debate on nuclear power in Australia, or an airport, or 
any number of issues, like raising the GST. The normal media advice is, in Australia, 
don’t give it any oxygen, don’t encourage or allow a debate, just kill it, and that’s 
what tends to happen. And that’s driven by the fact that if you don’t kill it quickly, it 
can run away from you, both by the media cycle and by the social media world.” 
Ken Henry described another aspect of media that is detrimental to debating 
policy robustly as being: 
“ Many of our politicians appear in front of the media several times a day. It’s very 
unlikely that they’re going to have had the time between interviews to develop well-
constructed thoughts about issues, even the issues of the day. Where is the time 
that is left to them, to construct well developed thoughts about the issues of tomor-
row, the longer term issues?”
In part, the failure of some of the current political leaders is the ability to suc-
cessfully utilise the media and adapt policy proposals to the changed media 
landscape. According to Steve Bracks, successful media management involves 
recognising that: 
“ They need to learn that they do not have to respond to the constant media cycle. 
You do not have to be a commentator on every issue of the day. You can be out 
and commenting when you have something to say which is about the real policy 
direction you want to pursue or there is an announcement that you want to make. 
“ This is an evolving issue and I think the new generation of people will come in and 
work through this.”
A suboptimal status quo
A major challenge in undertaking economic reforms in Australia is the lack of a 
pressing need for change. Compared to many other countries, the situation in 
Australia is far from intolerable.  Nick Greiner described the situation as: 
“ The difficulty is that, in many cases, in a country like Australia, the status quo’s not 
unacceptable, it’s just not optimal. And I think that’s the fundamental problem, that 
our situation is not too bad. You could say it’s the lucky country syndrome.”
These circumstances have helped create alleged reform fatigue. This is particu-
larly true when issues are contested and beneficiaries are more difficult to identify 
than losers. Bob Hawke described the role of a leader not to just respond to 
external circumstances but to attempt to optimise the nation’s prosperity.
“ Leaders should be about analysing and understanding what the current situation is, 
understanding what are the changing factors within your own country and exoge-
nously, which are going to affect the welfare of your country. And then understanding 
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those facts, it should be then about leading the people to understand the changes 
that are necessary to optimise your performance.” 
Consider the potential agricultural boom Australia may experience. Food demand 
projections suggest that accelerating Asian demand has the potential to grow 
Australia’s agricultural exports from $10 billion to $25 billion by 2050.4 Australia 
will need to effectively double its production of almost every export food com-
modity and much of this supply will need to come from northern Australia where 
vast tracts of arable and grazing land are available within close proximity to Asian 
supply chains. However, as David Farley describes in Challenges in northern 
Australia, without substantive policy changes Australia’s agricultural sector will 
not take the step change required to meet such an expanded demand. 
Feeding the growing middle classes of Asia is not just an economic opportunity 
for Australia. It also represents a means of the nation making a significant contri-
bution to global food security and social stability. Climate change has the potential 
to undermine the global capacity to meet rising agricultural demand, while rapid 
increases in food prices have been found to cause a significant level of social 
upheaval. The recent Arab Spring, where regime change and associated violence 
is still ongoing in a number of countries, had a proximate cause in protests over 
the increasing cost of food.5  
Unless Australia, and other food producing nations, increase production to meet 
rising Asian demand, the threat is that it will cause social upheaval as people 
in other parts of the world are forced into food poverty. Australia is one of the 
few countries with substantial amounts of potentially arable land available to be 
exploited. 
The challenge is not that Australia will fail to benefit from the Asian driven agri-
cultural boom. The nation’s globally competitive agricultural sector will certainly 
capitalise on any international stimulus presented by higher prices. However, 
a continuation of the status quo will not optimise Australia’s response to inter-
national conditions. The reforms and initiatives associated with enabling the 
agricultural sector to fully realise the opportunity represent second order changes 
and will only be achieved through model leadership and effective implementation 
of any proposed changes. 
According to CEDA’s research, Australia has the economic fundamentals that 
provide a basis for its economic expansion to continue for another decade.6 
However, there are a range of significant issues that need to be addressed for 
this forecast to be achieved. CEDA is examining the required economic reforms in 
the major report Australia Adjusting: Optimising national prosperity to 2025 to be 
released in November 2013. 
While no direct crisis will prompt Australia to undertake the economic reforms 
necessary to achieve this optimistic forecast, it will take highly skilled political 
leaders who are able to communicate and convince the Australian public that it 
is in their self-interest for the economic reforms to take place. They will need to 
develop robust economic reforms and have effective reform management so that 
the changes Australia needs to adopt can be implemented. 
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This chapter explores the leadership styles of key 
reformist politicians and what contributed to their 
success and failures.
1.  Politics and leadership  
styles
  Geoff Allen AM, and  
Michael Stutchbury
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Disclaimer 
The perceptions of leaders and their leadership styles are the contestable opinions of the authors. However, they are based on claims and 
comments made by the subjects about themselves, discussions with their close contemporary colleagues, and the significant engagement 
of the authors with the issues and personalities over the 30 years under discussion. 
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Introduction
This chapter looks at political leadership in a number of recent governments to 
explore the factors that facilitated successful reform, and conversely some that 
have not been conducive to long-run policy or political success. It is an attempt 
to draw out lessons that might be relevant for current and future leaders.
No political leader has a perfect set of attributes and the appropriateness of styles 
and personalities can vary with their circumstances. However, from the following 
exploration, common success factors appear to be:
Underlying consistency in values and ideological framework;•	
A strong sense of goals and desired policy outcomes;•	
Courage, but exercised with political skill, in pursuit of those objectives;•	
Avoidance of short term political gain at the expense of long-run policy •	
achievement;
Commitment to rigorous, evidence based policy analysis, and avoidance of •	
‘policy on the run’;
Commitment to, and patience in, building internal and external understanding •	
of proposed reforms; 
Professionalism in governance and policy development processes, including •	
the effective use of the bureaucracy and disciplined functioning of the cabinet 
or shadow cabinet.
The role of leadership
The ‘great man theory’ of history that attributes the overwhelming influence of 
individuals on major developments needs qualification.
As noted in the accompanying article by Greg Smith, shorthand perceptions of 
policy reform and its telling tends to ignore the build-up of evidence and demand 
for change, the role of supportive constituencies, and coalitions involved in its 
gestation and execution. He says: “Instead, the collective memory seems to hold 
one or two signature moments or individual performances, recalled repeatedly 
in shorthand accounts of events so popular in the media today (and perhaps 
popular with those individuals as well).”1 
The ideas were formed and ground prepared for the big reforms in our recent past 
by research, reports and advocacy well before they were translated into policy. 
Alf Ratigan and his Tariff Board were heavy lifters in a new consensus on pro-
tection, major tax reforms including the GST followed the Asprey Committee 
recommendations of the early 1970s, the financial sector and foreign exchange 
reforms implemented Campbell Committee recommendations to the previous 
regime and were promoted persistently by the Reserve Bank, the Business 
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Council of Australia’s two year research program pointed the way to enterprise 
bargaining and much of Paul Keating’s economic agenda was framed and encour-
aged by Treasury which had a very clear focus on what it wanted to achieve.
These in turn built on a climate of ideas emerging from a more policy engaged 
academia, think tanks and reflective journalism through the 1960s and 70s.
Nevertheless change normally requires political will and courage. Individuals and 
leadership groups are very significant to the way issues are framed, decisions are 
made and change is affected. 
It is tempting to draw simple contrasts between consensus and crash through 
styles, between incremental and visionary approaches, or again between con-
viction politics and managerial leadership. However, these characteristics often 
coexist to varying degrees in the political leaders discussed below. 
Visionary leadership has tended to be associated with the ‘crash-through’ styles 
of Jeff Kennett, Keating and New Zealand’s Sir Roger Douglas. This was certainly 
the case with the Opposition Leader, John Hewson. They were in a greater hurry 
and laid less emphasis on building consensus and preparing the political ground 
than for example John Howard and certainly Bob Hawke. 
However, big picture, visionary politicians seeking rapid and fundamental change 
do not have a monopoly on deep conviction about long term goals and aspira-
tions, nor on success in achieving them.
We often associate crash-through leadership 
with the need to address a crisis. This is the 
case with Kennett and Douglas, and no doubt 
Keating’s ‘banana republic’ statement was 
intended to engineer a sense of crisis to facili-
tate his change agenda. Hawke built on public 
concerns about industrial conflict and economic 
malaise, but consensus building and negotiated relations with major interests, 
particularly the Trade Unions, were more important preconditions for his reform 
achievements than a burning platform.
Nor was crisis essential to reforms that emerged after careful public engagement 
and the persistent values-driven approach of Howard. He achieved, for example, 
the consumption tax reform that was beyond the political reach of the previous 
government through pursuit of consensus between leading protagonists.
“…big picture, visionary politicians seeking rapid 
and fundamental change do not have a monopoly 
on deep conviction about long term goals and 
aspirations, nor on success in achieving them.”
s e t t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y
20
s e t t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y
21
Keating and the big picture
While the way politicians portray themselves is not always sound evidence, 
Keating was a self-proclaimed visionary, a big picture man seeking radical change 
in a hurry, a view that has been widely shared in public opinion.
In a speech in 2008, he said: “I belong to the school which 
says that individuals cannot only make a difference, but with 
imagination, make all the difference.”
He also noted: “Politicians who are in the business of poli-
tics but not in the business of change let their communities 
down, and badly. The political game is about, and only about, 
getting changes through.”2 
After an assessment of his contribution to Australian reform 
he told a business audience in 2011:
“As in everything, leadership is the key. Australia’s economic position dramatically 
improved with the adoption of a set of structural changes radically conceived and 
politically constructed. Conceived not by way of some bureaucratic master plan 
or process of increments, but by imagination and insight.”3 
While there are claims and counter-claims about who was the driving force 
behind various economic reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s there is no doubt 
Keating’s big picture view of reform and his personal energy and creativity was a 
very significant factor, achieving more, and more quickly, than might have been 
likely with a more inclusive, consensual style.
As distinct from some big picture leaders discussed below, Keating was also an 
effective politician as well as committed reformer.
Major skills included energy and passion for his causes, and a great capacity to 
simplify and articulate his position on major issues. Both internally and externally 
he exhibited a highly persuasive gift for narrative to support his ideas and objec-
tives. He routinely tested his policies by asking, ‘how does this fit with the story?’ 
He also had a knack of picking the right time to act. For example waiting until soon 
after the 1993 election when he had viciously attacked the industrial decentralisa-
tion policies of Hewson, he took advantage of the collaborative work with unions 
initially led by Hawke, to introduce a significant shift to enterprise bargaining. 
This was just one example of the political pragmatism not always associated with 
reformist leaders. Another was his use of all the arguments against Hewson’s 
indirect taxes that he had defended against when espousing their benefits as 
Treasurer.
His highly individualist personality and style made him impatient of bureaucracy 
and due process. Cabinet colleagues accused him of inattention to, and being 
disrespectful of, cabinet protocols and of making announcements without what 
they considered to be appropriate internal discussion. While he had a close inner 
circle of his most trusted and respected colleagues, other ministers sometimes 
“Keating’s big picture view of reform 
and his personal energy and creativity 
was a very significant factor, achieving 
more, and more quickly, than might 
have been likely with a more inclusive, 
consensual style.”
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found him inaccessible. Cabinet colleague Neal Blewett in 1992 contrasted 
Keating with Hawke whose unique talents were a combination of “passion for 
bureaucracy and amazing populist appeal…Usually the bureaucratic politician 
lacks charisma and the charismatic is normally sloppy and accident-prone. Not 
so Hawke”. Keating, he said: “…has a real disdain for bureaucracy and bureau-
cratic processes.”4
However, there were times such as when the High Court’s Mabo decision required 
a government response, Keating acknowledged he did not have solutions 
and threw himself into an energetic round of stakeholder negotiations to build 
a workable response. His last term policies towards enterprise bargaining were 
developed consensually, at least with some colleagues and the ACTU leadership.
His strengths included energy and drive that came from strong belief in himself, 
his ‘story’ and his ‘true believers’. But some observers have noted that elements 
of these strengths limited his empathy, and engagement, with the electorate.
The Kennett reforms
Victorian Premier, Jeff Kennett was another big picture leader associated with 
radical reform.
His effective leadership began before taking over government. 
He inherited a parlous state economy and fiscal position and leveraged the per-
ception of crisis hard both in opposition and government to maximise acceptance 
of his agenda.
This agenda was planned, and developed in detail within the parliamentary party 
and external private sector support before assuming office, enabling a relatively 
rapid implementation of his well-researched program. It included extensive cuts to 
government expenditure, rationalisation of government services, and the radical 
privatisation of government sector enterprises.
His demands on his ministers were relentless, brooking no compromises or 
equivocation but achieving a strong sense of cohesion and unity of purpose 
among them. Where he felt they were competent he gave them space to run 
their portfolios, but where he had less confidence in them they were thoroughly 
micromanaged. Colleagues report he was an efficient and effective manager of 
the cabinet process.
The demands he made on the bureaucracy were also relentless. He enhanced 
the public service with high calibre recruits, and his commitment to its excellence, 
followed by subsequent governments, changed its culture and helped build the 
Victorian public service’s reputation as a national leader.
However, of most significance was the single-minded objective he, and his 
Treasurer Alan Stockdale, brought to government – fixing the State’s economy 
through budget repair and micro economic reform. He was so conscious of the 
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value to effective government having an overarching purpose that, when much of 
the heavy fiscal lifting had been done, he set about seeking another overarching 
objective to unify and give purpose to his government. 
As part of this process he asked his ministers to submit future reform ideas in 
writing to be done by them personally without staff or the public service. Some 
ministers saw this as a ministerial performance review process through essay 
competition.
Kennett was conscious of the need to explain to the public the net benefits of 
the demands he was making for radical change, for example the traffic benefits 
of tolling roads, but did not wait for public support to be forthcoming. Indeed, 
each individual aspect of his agenda caused disruption to the interests of some 
individuals or groups so that opposition seemed inevitable. 
He rejected advice to pursue one reform at a time and only take incremental 
steps, and he stood strong and with great conviction when there were massive 
protests against the government’s actions. Indeed 
Kennett felt that going fast on a multitude of fronts 
had tactical merit against oppositional interest 
groups, exploiting advantages of ambush, splitting 
opposition forces, and framing and fighting issues 
on his own ground.
While building and maintaining a strong internal 
consensus, his external reputation was one of divi-
siveness, making sustained reform more politically 
difficult.
Reasons given for his narrow election loss after eight years of government were 
not that his reforms themselves were unsuccessful. The party acknowledged that 
they underestimated the feeling of neglect in rural electorates where the election 
was won, and some blamed reform fatigue and the disruption caused to many 
individuals as a result of reforms. However, many commentators observed that 
it was because a degree of arrogance and hyperbole had crept in through his 
undoubted successes, particularly late in his term of office.
Douglas across the ditch
It is useful to explore the approach of two other big picture politicians in a hurry for 
reform – New Zealand Finance Minister Douglas, and Coalition Opposition Leader 
John Hewson – to see what lessons can be learned.
Douglas and a small group of reformist ministers are credited with turning the 
fortunes of New Zealand around in the 1980s. His was a copy-book program of 
rationalist policies that, while urgently needed, led to a public reaction that sent 
his party into oblivion for 10 years and caused a shift in the nature of government 
that was to make future reform very difficult.
“Kennett was conscious of the need to explain 
to the public the net benefits of the demands he 
was making for radical change, for example the 
traffic benefits of tolling roads, but did not wait 
for public support to be forthcoming.”
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Douglas’ maiden speech had supported New Zealand’s stifling price controls and 
industry protection, but no doubt goaded by economic circumstances and with 
quality advisors, he morphed into a free market crusader.
After taking on and winning just enough support in his Labor Party caucus in 
the mid-1980s he somewhat audaciously launched on an unsuspecting public a 
large integrated package of reforms, prepared by an inner group, but not revealed 
in opposition. It included a new tax system involving a consumption tax, radical 
reductions in protection policies, financial deregulation and public sector reform 
through rapid privatisation of state owned enterprises.
Apart from a burning platform, Douglas also had the huge advantage of the gov-
ernment having the majority in a single house of parliament and no federal system 
of diffused power. As with Keating and Hawke, the reforms were consistent with 
the ideas of the increasingly conservative party opposition and a number received 
bipartisan support.
In post-hoc reflections on leadership and the 
reform process, Douglas noted lessons that 
emerged from the way he went about pursuing 
reform.
In the forward to a book he wrote at the time, 
his close ministerial colleague Richard Prebble, 
recalls the approach taken.
Prebble said: “We ask ourselves ‘What is the problem? Let us ignore the politics’. 
And again we ask ourselves ‘What is the best solution?’ Then we set about trying 
to sell the solutions without in any way compromising.”5 
This reflects one of Douglas’ reform injunctions: “If a solution makes sense in the 
medium term, go for it without qualification or hesitation. Nothing else delivers a 
result that will truly satisfy the public.”6 
Douglas acknowledged the value of consensus support and convincing the public 
of the merit of his policies (‘Let the dog see the rabbit’). He says it requires selling 
the benefits of reform to overcome its costs, and ensure cooperation, but if, as is 
usually necessary, this can be post hoc:
“Consensus among interest groups on quality decisions rarely, if ever, arises 
before they are made and implemented. It develops after they are taken, as deci-
sions deliver satisfactory results to the public.”7 
He says governments need to have the courage to take the tough decisions and 
be judged later on the results. In particular, he sees this as necessary to ambush 
vested interests by a range of tactics, including speed of action and creation of 
the fait accompli, to counter their “mobilising quite powerful opposition against 
reform”.8 
As with Kennett, Douglas rejected the cautious advice to go one step at a time. 
Packaging reforms and moving towards them in quantum leaps enables the ben-
efits of one part of the package for some, to be better balanced with costs. 
“Douglas’ maiden speech had supported New 
Zealand’s stifling price controls and industry 
protection, but no doubt goaded by economic 
circumstances and with quality advisors, he 
morphed into a free market crusader.”
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“The fire of opponents is much less accurate if they have to shoot at a moving 
target…..Before you remove the privileges of a protected sector, it will tend to 
see change as a threat which has to be opposed at all costs. After you remove 
its privileges and make plain that the clock cannot be turned back, the group 
starts to focus on removing the privileges of other groups that still hold up its own 
costs.”9
While experts agree the thrust of the Douglas reforms was necessary, the political 
fall-out does not seem to support the optimism of the assertion that good policy 
is always, good politics. Over time, it is shown to be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition. The Party won the subsequent election in 1987 but with a significant 
loss of seats and lost the 1990 election badly, before it went into oblivion for a 
decade. Differences in the party on these issues led to the splitting off of a radical 
reform group led by Douglas – The Association of Consumers and Taxpayers – 
and what was to become the left wing Alliance Party.
Douglas has spent his subsequent years bewailing his “unfinished business”.
He wrongly attributes his party’s electoral demise in 1990, not to a negative public 
reaction to reform, but his prime minister’s political nervousness and reneging 
on further radical changes to the tax structure. These changes included moving 
to a flat tax, which in fact went too far for most party colleagues, let alone the 
electorate.
More seriously, the public reaction to what was regarded as high-handed break-
through radical change led to the introduction and maintenance of an entirely new 
electoral system through referenda (Mixed Member Proportional voting – MMP). 
This bestows power on smaller parties, leading to continuous minority govern-
ments. While after 25 years there are current successes in economic reform, this 
has made challenging reform more difficult, where no one party can govern in its 
own right.
Douglas’ clear vision, careful technical preparation and efficiency in execution 
achieved a great deal in a short time. The political fallout of radical change without 
semblance of popular mandate may well have been worth the achievement, but 
the question is whether a more empathetic execution based on a greater atten-
tion to building internal and external support could have enabled the reforms in a 
manner that made ongoing reform progress more possible. 
Hewson’s Fightback
John Hewson’s approach to the 1993 Australian election was an example of 
crash through politics to achieve the leader’s vision. 
The policy package he brought to the election was a detailed free market eco-
nomic manifesto called Fightback, which proposed a series of market oriented 
micro economic reforms, and a relatively all-embracing 15 per cent consumption 
tax compensated for by significant income tax cuts and welfare safety nets.
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This was a stretch for the Australian public and while it might have survived suc-
cessful campaigning, Hewson was forced in the campaign to back down on the 
inclusion of food in the GST package, with a consequent offset to income tax 
reductions. 
As a relative newcomer in a relatively unstable party leadership, Hewson worked 
with a small group of parliamentary colleagues. He kept the development of 
policy close to his chest and that of a small group of external consultants. He 
did not engage fully within the party because he was no doubt very confident of 
his technical economic and policy expertise, but also possibly because, as some 
suggest, he was insecure in his leadership
The program was very much his personal agenda, about which he felt 
passionately.
For many Fightback was seen as good policy. Notwithstanding his visceral 
attacks on it, it could reasonably be seen as a purist extension of the Keating 
agenda. The key element – a GST with tax and welfare compensation – albeit in 
a more moderate form – along with other measures, such as further tariff reduc-
tions, were introduced subsequently, in a further wave of reform. 
While Hewson was strong in technical policy development, he had been elected 
Opposition Leader after only three years in parliament and seemed unprepared 
politically. Unlike Howard and Hawke, he was 
uncomfortable with broader political interac-
tion, including with the general public. This is 
a factor worth noting for those naïve observ-
ers who assert business leaders without 
political experience, for example, could or 
should move quickly to political leadership.
Inexperience on the hustings together with 
the radical nature of the package put to an 
unprepared electorate, and Keating’s ability to mount an effective scare cam-
paign, gave the Labor Party an unexpected victory.
While some question the political wisdom of publishing a highly detailed election 
manifesto (arguably the most detailed ever put to any electorate), the clear vision 
and technical preparation for government, and a clear mandate for a program, 
would have facilitated an efficient translation of reform ideas into government.
However, while its lack of success was down in part to Keating’s political skills, it 
also clearly lacked an internal and external stakeholder embrace. 
As with Howard’s WorkChoices, Fightback was seen to push the envelope too 
far for the electorate, making it vulnerable to a scare campaign without adequate 
education and articulate exposition of the reasons the public needed to accept 
challenging disruption.
We can assume also that a lack of attention to building strong consensus with 
parliamentary colleagues would have made implementation more challenging in 
government. 
“As with Howard’s WorkChoices, Fightback was seen 
to push the envelope too far for the electorate, making 
it vulnerable to a scare campaign without adequate 
education and articulate exposition of the reasons the 
public needed to accept challenging disruption.”
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Hawke, the consensus politician
It is not only self-styled visionary and big picture political leaders that are associ-
ated with significant reform.
Two of Australia’s most successful political leaders, Hawke and Howard have in 
fact pointedly distanced themselves from this leadership style.
Bob Hawke has been judged the ultimate consensus politician, a view built ini-
tially on his stated philosophy in the 1979 Boyer Lectures on The Resolution of 
Conflict and his first major act in government – the calling in 1983 of The National 
Economic Summit to garner support for a new structure of relationships between 
the major economic parties.
In discussing the Summit, Hawke claimed in his 1994 memoirs:
“The idea of uniting the country around commonly agreed values and goals on 
the basis of a shared understanding of economic realities was the centrepiece of 
my thinking for the future of Australia.” 
He quotes his personal aide-memoire at the time: “Essentially the Government is 
concerned to manage the economy in a way which reflects the consensus of all 
sectors of the community and is based on an assumption of mutuality of interests 
and widespread goodwill between all Australians.”10
This appeared to be a timely approach in a divisive period in politics that started 
in the Whitlam era and had been more recently impacted by economic pressure 
and internecine industrial conflict. 
The Labor Party had reached an accommodation with an enlightened trade union 
leadership that traded some wage restraint for a broader package of complemen-
tary policies and a more centralised national planning orientation. 
In part reflecting the modus operandi of the tripartite centralised industrial relations 
system that was so much part of his personal history, Hawke sought to underpin 
this in government by incorporating peak councils and corporate leadership of 
the business sector into a tripartite consensus. 
Built on his recent electoral mandate and general reaction to industrial dishar-
mony, Hawke and the ACTU leadership, through a guided and carefully managed 
political process, achieved the Summit’s endorsement, inter alia, of a range of 
tripartite consultative mechanisms. These involved relevant peak bodies and 
included the Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC), Advisory Committee 
on Prices and Incomes (ACPI) and the Australian Manufacturing Council.
EPAC, actively led by Hawke and Treasurer Keating, was very influential in its first 
few years. It was a vehicle through which non-government parties could, and 
did, initiate and contribute thoughtful and well researched papers, for example 
on taxation and other micro economic areas. These papers from government 
sources, the newly formed Business Council of Australia and other participants, 
were published and foreshadowed and gave impetus to many of the reforms sub-
sequently pursued by the Hawke and the Keating governments. The significance 
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of EPAC was the collective and open discussion of major reform options by major 
stakeholders within the very heart of government.
Through sharing information and research this enhanced the education of leading 
players, and through discussion away from political constituencies it optimised 
agreement between the parties, leaving only residual issues to be identified and 
fought over.
As Hawke said in relation to taxation reform: “Involving EPAC, a framework for 
consultation between constituent community groups, government, business, 
unions, the professions, welfare groups – early in the tax reform process was in 
line with my aspiration to govern inclusively and consensually.”11 
The evolution of EPAC provides a meta-
phor for comparing Hawke’s consensus 
with Keating’s individualism. As noted 
Hawke used it to embrace constituen-
cies, whereas Keating became intolerant 
of what he perceived as the mediocrity of 
external participants, abandoned them, 
and turned it into a Prime Ministerial 
think tank. Eventually Howard blended it 
into the Productivity Commission.
Hawke in retirement was keen to differentiate himself from Keating’s stress on 
individual leadership
Hawke has given his own contrasting assessment of his own leadership style: 
“I was a trusting, non-interventionist leader who allowed ministers their heads, 
not least because they had good heads, and because experience has taught 
me that talented people work best when they are respected and left alone to do 
their jobs. I provided leadership by identifying the important issues, talking to my 
ministers about them.”12 And again: “I wish to emphasise that the Hawke Labor 
Government was a team…Alone I did not do it.”13 
As noted, self-reflection does not always constitute good evidence, and there 
were times when Hawke acted unilaterally or was intolerant of oppositional per-
spectives. He was also at times criticised for being indecisive and compared 
unfavourable with Keating in this respect.
Those close to Hawke have noted his strong adherence to traditional public 
administration, including respectful dealings with the public service, and strict 
cabinet protocols for process and policy development. These facilitated stability 
and effective management that in turn enabled a contestable flow of ideas, and 
well managed execution.
However, the processes of education, dialogue and negotiation he put in place 
both inside the Labor movement and in the wider public at the time, were impor-
tant to the capacity of his government – and those governments that immediately 
followed – to achieve significant reforms. 
“The evolution of EPAC provides a metaphor for comparing 
Hawke’s consensus with Keating’s individualism. As noted 
Hawke used it to embrace constituencies, whereas Keating 
became intolerant of what he perceived as the mediocrity of 
external participants, abandoned them, and turned it into a 
Prime Ministerial think tank.”
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Howard’s leadership
Howard also had a very different perception of his role to that of his predecessor 
Keating, and his statement of it in his autobiography appears to be a deliberate 
one of differentiation around “the vision thing”.
He said: “I did not come to office resolved to turn a nation on its head…I wanted 
to have a vigorous debate about the need for change in those areas that are 
holding the nation back, but my starting point was one of optimism about the 
condition of the Australian spirit. I had a program in mind, but I was not so arro-
gant as to assume that I should inflict on the Australian people a new vision for the 
nation…Good leadership interprets and applies the received values of a nation. In 
many ways, the changes I wished to bring about would more directly echo the 
instincts, of the Australian people, rather than impose on them something new, 
and about which they would feel uncomfortable.”14 
However, while Howard openly eschewed the “vision thing” his approach to policy 
was very strongly based on his own personal values; he did have a clear view of 
the direction he wanted Australia to take. 
This consistent purpose led him to normally avoid opportunistic political point 
scoring when it conflicted with his philosophical position. He is proud that, rather 
than exercising a veto for political advantage, many of the Hawke/Keating reforms 
that were compatible with his party’s own approach were only made possible by 
their support in opposition.
His values and general directions were set out in a series of Headland Speeches 
and his dogged pursuit of some preoccupations such as national security and 
industrial relations gave him the label of ‘conviction’ politician.
But while he himself has asserted “conviction is the mother of success in politics”, 
he also has acknowledged: “Compromise is a necessary political tool.” 
He was an effective manager of his political capital and, for example, accepted 
the considerable concession of exempting food, to get necessary GST reform in 
place. As a colleague said, he declared 80 per cent a victory, and moved on.
However, compromise was less on the table as he doggedly pursued water-
front reform; he showed an unwillingness to give ground to populist sentiment 
and tough opposition when his task was strongly aligned with his deepest 
convictions.
Ultimately his conviction-driven over-reaching on WorkChoices took him beyond 
his stated “interpreting and applying the received values of a nation” and what the 
public would wear.
Nevertheless, despite this over-reaching, and without the populism of Hawke, 
much of his political success has been attributed to his understanding of public 
sentiment. 
He enjoyed his engagement with the public. He said: “Throughout my politi-
cal career, and especially in the time I held a leadership role, I sought constant 
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personal contact with voters, beyond what was in meeting commitments, to 
discuss their concerns or attending functions to which I had been invited.” 16 
This engagement was extended by incessant appearances on talk back radio 
that also provided him with the opportunity to constantly explain his views to the 
public without the filter of press gallery interpretation and emphasis. This use of 
the media gave him initiative in the emerging 24 hour news cycle phenomenon.
While arguably he was more ideological than Hawke, he shared a similar commit-
ment to public administration through disciplined and formal cabinet government. 
Except in relation to those few ideological certainties, Howard was open to inter-
nal ideas and worked hard to find internal consensus with his colleagues around 
central themes. 
Paul Kelly noted: “The main instrument of Howard’s Prime Ministerial power is the 
cabinet…Howard uses the cabinet as an instrument of his authority, of ministerial 
consultation, obedience and unity. The contentious issues are cleared through 
cabinet…It is the most unified cabinet since Menzies and reflects a remarkably 
shared outlook.”17 
A further hallmark of Howard’s leadership was his personal organisation and dis-
cipline, characterised by his daily routine, and refusal to be too distracted from 
the routine affairs of government by the daily crises, or personal passions. 
Lessons from leaders
Behind this exploration of leadership styles is a desire to understand what makes 
good policy for the longer term. 
Readers will make their own judgements about how these assessments of lead-
ership characteristics compare with political leadership at the time of publication, 
but in doing this we should note what are claimed to be differences in the political 
environment of today.
The three years before this publication, government was bedevilled by a hung 
national parliament and minority governments in some states. However, most 
governments discussed above did not have majorities in upper houses of par-
liament and major reforms were only made possible by the cooperation of 
opposition parties.
Changes in the media cycle are more significant, although as noted they 
were evolving in the latter part of John Howard’s leadership and were actively 
addressed by his personal media omnipresence. A focus on strong long term 
policy directions has helped some leaders to rise above being absorbed into the 
daily political detritus which the media amplifies. 
We note that burning platforms are helpful in achieving change; the public is more 
ready to make the sacrifices of adjustment. But it is not a necessary, precondition 
for getting significant change. Economic crises were acknowledged to be critical 
to the Kennett and Douglas revolutions, and while acknowledging the economic 
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downturn of the 1990s, the inability to convince the public of 
one was arguably a problem for Hewson’s radical requests of 
the electorate in 1993.
Every opposition attempts to create a sense of crisis to deni-
grate the governments they wish to supplant, but only some 
seek to use it to establish a mandate to achieve difficult policy 
reforms.
In their post-hoc assessments of their own regimes, both 
Douglas and Keating have asserted that good policy is good 
politics. We would certainly hope this is true but the experiences of leaders identi-
fied above suggest good policy needs to be supported by competent political 
management and can be thwarted by the converse.
Policy planning 
A common element in success has been careful consideration and preparation 
for government, based on careful evidence-based analysis of policy proposals. 
Hawke and leadership of the Labor movement carefully prepared a program for 
government, including through the Prices and Incomes Accord that was nego-
tiated between the party and the ACTU. An examination of the Accord reveals 
some of it – particularly its strong focus on centralised planning – was antitheti-
cal to eventual policy. However, its main task, successfully implemented, was to 
break wage and price inflation and set up mechanisms for restraint and collabo-
ration across the economy.
The ability of Douglas and Kennett to achieve dramatic change in a short time 
was due to careful and detailed work, including a thorough working through of 
options and the corralling of international best practice in relevant areas.
While Hawke laid out a positive environment for change, Keating bunkered down 
with the Treasury and his staff for some time, and absorbed the extant body of 
reform proposals before emerging with a cohesive agenda that he then leveraged 
effectively.
Howard’s preparation owed much to his long period in opposition during which 
he engaged actively with the liberalising agenda of the government and honed his 
policy positions. It was clear from his consistent response to contemporary issues 
what he would seek to do in government.
The need for evidence-based policy has been the mantra of leaders in public 
administration, but is often ignored in favour of populist appeal, limited analysis 
before commitment to policy or ad hoc response to a political flashpoint. 
Policies introduced as thought bubbles on the run, to give the impression of activ-
ism or to resolve short term political problems, have normally been flawed and 
frequently proven to be politically counterproductive. The risk of this is greatest in 
election campaigns when there is a premium on electoral popularity.
“Every opposition attempts to create 
a sense of crisis to denigrate the 
governments they wish to supplant, 
but only some seek to use it to 
establish a mandate to achieve 
difficult policy reforms.”
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Commitment to reform and consistency of 
purpose
Another common element in success has been a strong sense of policy direction 
and a set of core values. This has reflected long term views of where leaders 
wanted to take their country and the best path to achieving it. No one has 
doubted what the successful leaders discussed above stood for.
This is in contrast to politicians whose major focus is less on policy and more on 
winning and retaining the exercise of power, and who are most heavily oriented to 
the political ‘game’.
Consistency is important and, as noted, Howard’s eschewing of short term politi-
cal advantage through rejection of Hawke and Keating reforms, stood him in good 
stead for his period of government.
Keating’s constant testing of policy options against ‘the big picture story’ is a tes-
tament to this, as is his view of the value of overarching frameworks within which 
individual policies must play their part.
This consistency of view and appreciation of a broader framework means that 
small and incremental decisions add up to achieving larger goals, and recourse to 
convenient ad hoc responses under pressure do not undermine them.
Political sophistication
However all of this takes place in a political environment and clearly good policies 
will fail if not supported by astute politics. While long term goals provide guid-
ance for activity, the policy end game does not need to be unpacked when it is 
not tactically useful to do so. Howard’s second term GST initiative, and Keating’s 
second term push to enterprise bargaining, show that policies need to be intro-
duced strategically.
While notwithstanding the valid criticism that most politicians have inadequate 
experience of the real world, political inexperience and poor political judgement is 
shown to prevent the introduction and sustainability of reform. 
s e t t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y
32
s e t t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y
33
Communication and consultation
The quality and extent of communication and consultation has been a determi-
nant of success in reform although it has taken different shapes and the leaders 
have given different emphasis to their engagement with various stakeholders.
Hawke’s priority was to achieve maximum mutual understanding with peak bodies 
and other representative organisations, and with high profile leaders.
Howard was less inclined to embrace so called ‘representatives’ but (as did 
Hawke) he engaged effectively with the general public and gaged their issues 
instinctively.
Keating also engaged but mainly with support-
ive elites than peak bodies, and later in his Prime 
Ministership narrowed his range of interlocutors 
further. With the public he concentrated on his con-
sistent narrative, “spinning the tale” but commonly 
asserted leadership was not about being popular 
but “about being right”.
The willingness and ability to engage empathetically 
and consultatively with ‘influencers’ and the elector-
ate and respond to their moods has been a critical factor in policy success and 
its limitations. While major achievements were won without this in the case of 
Keating, Douglas and Kennett, losing touch with the electorate, and in the view of 
some, a degree of arrogance and hyperbole inconsistent with the public psyche, 
cost each of them the opportunity to continue their reformist programs.
At the same time the style of leadership that simply reflects public opinion gained 
for example by focus groups and polling does not inspire challenging reform, and 
in the long run, is likely to be counterproductive politically. 
Internal cohesion
Of great importance to ongoing success has been the capacity to build internal 
cohesion around policy directions. While factions and diverse opinions exist in all 
parties, autocratic leadership and poor management can lead to unseemly divi-
sion and frustrate the reform agendas of governments. 
Hawke and Howard tended to do this by patient dialogue with the front bench 
and party. Keating and Kennett were attentive to the need for it, but more direct 
and assertive in winning internal support. Nevertheless each of them, through 
their own means of internal relationship management, achieved the cohesion 
necessary to go forward without having to watch their back.
“Policies introduced as thought bubbles on 
the run, to give the impression of activism or 
to resolve short term political problems, have 
normally been flawed and frequently proven to be 
politically counterproductive.”
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While there was no open dissention at the time, the more limited building of 
support by Hewson and Douglas had negative consequences for them, their 
parties and their reform ambitions.
It is worth noting that Hawke and Keating achieved significantly more in tandem 
than separately, and a deep and mutually supportive relationship between Kennett 
and Treasurer Stockdale was essential to their success. 
Disciplined governance and public administration
Finally there appears to be a strong correlation between success and good inter-
nal processes. Significant adherents to cabinet protocols have led to effective 
consideration of issues and helped garner informed internal support. Conversely, 
where they have broken down by leadership neglect or excessive reliance on 
private staff or ‘kitchen cabinets’, there has been not only disquiet and com-
plaint, but also serious mistakes in policy or its presentation. Unnecessary errors 
of judgement are made because of missed opportunities to utilise the collective 
judgement and experience of ministerial colleagues. 
There is legitimate criticism of the build-up of ministerial staff, a process develop-
ing through the period under discussion and peaking in recent years. The criticism 
is largely because the roles they assume often go beyond their competence and 
experience, and lead to a consequent diminution in the proximity of ministers to 
the career public service. 
Where the public service is frozen out of the 
processes of policy consideration, and margin-
alised by ministers and their staff, the wisdom 
and experience of, talented and usually com-
mitted officials is lost to the detriment of good 
policy.
However, a small number of highly qualified 
experts in the private offices of leaders have 
been important to successful reform. Leaders 
in the period under review have been well served by the likes of Ross Garnaut 
and Craig Emerson on Hawke’s staff, Ken Henry, Don Russell and John Edwards 
on Keating’s and for example the role played for Howard by Arthur Sinodinus.
Where they have not had such high profile staff advisors – as in the case of 
Kennett and Douglas – there has been a concerted effort to leverage the best 
possible advice and support from academia and, for example, the professions.
Finally the role of the public service has evolved over time. It retains some of the 
nation’s best and brightest although some fear that progressively through this 
period there has been an unfortunate decline in the human capital attracted to 
public service careers. 
“Where the public service is frozen out of the 
processes of policy consideration, and marginalised 
by ministers and their staff, the wisdom and 
experience of talented and usually committed 
officials is lost to the detriment of good policy.”
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Career public servants have been used both effectively and ineffectively over the 
years. Hawke, Howard and their staff have had constructive relationships, par-
ticularly with leaders in central agencies, and Keating’s close relationship with 
selected Treasury officers has been much commented on.
The significance of government to Australia’s economic and social welfare is 
such that we should optimise our leadership potential and ensure our govern-
ment leaders at all levels have a brave and disciplined focus on continuing policy 
reform.
s e t t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y
36
s e t t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y
37
Endnotes
1  Smith, Greg, Economic policy reform as successful change leadership, CEDA Policy Perspective, August 2013, Setting Public Policy, 
p.49
2  Financial Innovation and labour Reform in the Post-Industrial Age, Speech to Chosen Ilbo – Asian leadership Conference, Seoul, 21 
February, 2008,  Published in PJ Keating, Afterwords; The Prime Ministerial Speeches, Allen and Unwin 2011 p.581.
3  Paul Keating, The Re-emerging Crisis; the World Malaise – Mid 2011, Speech to Price WaterhouseCoopers, Sydney, 28 July, 2011, Op 
Cit, p.606
4  Neal Blewett, A Cabinet Diary, Wakefield Press 1999, p183
5  Roger Douglas and Louise Callan, Towards Prosperity; People and Politics in the 1980s. Bateman 1987, Forward
6  Roger Douglas. Unfinished Business, Random House, New Zealand, 1993. p.217
7  ibid p.223
8  ibid p.223
9  ibid p.226
10  Bob Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs. William Heinemann Australia, 1994. P. 170
11  ibid p.297
12  ibid p.251
13  ibid p.160–1
14  John Howard, Lazarus Rising.  Harper Collins, 2010. p.233–4
15  ibid p.669
16  ibid p.559
17  Paul Kelly, Rethinking Australian Governance: the Howard Legacy, Australian Journal of Public Administration 65(1) 7–24 March 2006. 
P.10
s e t t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y
36
s e t t i n g  p u b l i c  p o l i c y
37
This chapter explores how major economic policy 
reform is achieved and the key factors that can 
substantially improve the chances of success.
2.  Economic policy reform 
as successful change 
leadership 
 Greg Smith 
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Introduction
This paper is about achieving major economic policy reform.
Major change in any field is difficult. It is usually resisted by many of those it 
affects. Every project faces unique circumstances and features, including many 
unknowns. And there is no formula for success that will work every time.
This paper does not offer a bullet-proof way forward – there is none. Rather, the 
goal of the paper is to identify the things that substantially improve the chances 
of success. In particular, it looks for the things that make major economic policy 
reform less difficult, through a change leadership approach relying more on paving 
the way rather than just courageously, or recklessly, charging forward.
In some ways, policymakers pursuing major policy reform face similar challenges 
as business leaders seeking major organisational change. Much has been written 
on delivering large scale change in business organisations, but less so on major 
policy change. In this paper, we will follow a well-known framework used in 
organisational change and apply it, with suitable modifications, to major policy 
change in the Australian setting.
Throughout the discussion, the story is illustrated by reference to some of 
Australia’s major economic policy achievements over the past three decades. 
Why reform is a difficult type of change
The purpose of change is to solve problems, even where the problem is simply 
that we don’t yet have what we want. Theorists of change in a range of fields1 
have identified two fundamentally different types of change confronting human 
experience – first and second order change.
First order changes are the adjustments we make to keep things on track, and 
most of our work is directed to this type of change. These adjustments occur 
mainly within existing systems which themselves do not change much. Balances 
are restored, functions are repaired, and shortages are topped up. This is mainly 
a management task, rather than a leadership task. Most people are quite good at 
it, and it is widely supported because the system and its expected impacts on us 
are already well known. First order change has its challenges, but it usually offers 
clear reward for effort.
Second order changes are those that take us on an entirely new path. They sig-
nificantly transform or even replace existing systems, pursuing new goals and/or 
using entirely new methods. More and more changes of this type are demanded 
of us as the modern era unfolds. It requires leadership more than management, 
because few start out able to see or understanding the new systems and even 
fewer believe they want to be part of it. Taking a new direction starts with uncer-
tainty and carries risks. Far fewer people are good at it. 
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Major economic policy reform is overwhelming of the second order kind. That is 
one reason it is so hard and not attempted by many. Some policymakers like to 
call their policy proposals ‘reforms’ but that is not necessarily what they are. They 
are often little more than first order adjustments, perhaps just scaling up spending 
programs or handing back some windfall tax revenues.
What is major economic policy reform?
To qualify as major economic reform, a change needs to meet three main criteria:
It is substantively second order change, taking Australia in a major new •	
direction;
It is sustainable (and usually ultimately bipartisan) because it is change that •	
our economy and society clearly needs to respond to real shifts in the policy 
environment; and 
It is change that serves the public or national interest, rather than just one sector •	
against others. Generally, that means it is well-founded in economic principles.
For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, policy reform most often referred to 
large scale changes that ‘put a human face’ on industrial capitalism, or which built 
new institutional architectures in the aftermath of devastating economic depres-
sion or world war. This era of political, social and economic reform built the basic 
institutional frameworks that still largely define the developed economies today.
However, from around the late 1960s and 1970s, it became apparent that many 
economies had begun to misfire, with ‘stagflation’, low economic growth, missed 
opportunities and other problems. At about the same time, several developing 
countries mainly in East Asia set out on new trade and market oriented paths 
towards rapid economic development. While generally welcomed, this began to 
put considerable structural pressure on the already under-performing developed 
economies.
So in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, reform 
has more often meant large scale economic policy 
change needed to restore, or create, vibrant eco-
nomic growth. This switch in reform focus has been 
driven further by many other factors including the 
increasing mobility of capital, labour and knowledge, 
new information and communication technologies, 
other structural economic shifts and demographic 
change. Factors like these have meant that the pressure for further reform contin-
ues – that change itself has become an unchanging challenge.
“A popular adage among experienced public 
servants is that major change follows, or even 
requires, a crisis. This is a narrow version of 
the more general proposition that achieving 
change requires a sense of urgency.”
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In Australia, major economic reform has included the reduction of trade and 
investment barriers, floating of the dollar and removal of exchange controls, pri-
vatisation and other shifts toward competitive markets, pro-growth reforms in the 
taxation and financial systems, the building of a new three-tier retirement income 
system, and more flexible arrangements in labour markets. Several states have 
also pursued reform agendas, making significant advances in the provision of 
public services, regulatory frameworks and infrastructure.
An outline of the change framework
How was major change achieved? What were the main elements of successful 
strategies? Did they have parallels with the major elements in leading organisa-
tional change?
Perhaps the best known of the business change leadership frameworks is that 
developed by Dr John Kotter while at the Harvard Business School.2 He pro-
posed that success requires an eight stage process, directed to three different 
but related sub-goals. In summary these are:
A. Addressing resistance to change
1. Establishing a sense of urgency
2. Creating a powerful, guiding coalition
3. Developing a vision and strategy
4. Communicating the change vision
B. Delivering the change
5. Empowering others to act
6. Generating short term wins
7. Consolidating gains and producing more change
C. Making change stick
8. Anchoring new approaches to the culture
While all are important, the first five of these stages seem particularly relevant 
to public policy reform because they relate mainly to overcoming resistance and 
building support. These are the main challenges faced in the essentially political 
task of achieving public policy reform. We now discuss each of these in the public 
policy context, illustrating them with Australian experience in the past 30 years.
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Stage 1: We need a crisis – creating urgency
A popular adage among experienced public servants is that major change follows, 
or even requires, a crisis. This is a narrow version of the more general propo-
sition that achieving change requires a sense of urgency. In either formulation, 
the required sense requires not just that something real is pressing, but that an 
urge to respond is widely shared. Creating urgency is the process of generating 
and widely sharing this state of mind about the problem, first and foremost, even 
before there is any clear proposal about what to do. 
Indeed, it is often best if there is no immediate solution on offer. This is not 
easy for some politicians. Many desperately want to be seen as in charge and 
on top – to have the answers and the right promises to deliver them. However, 
in practice rushing to solutions can undermine the sense of urgency. First, if a 
solution is readily to hand, the situation is hardly pressing. More importantly, the 
rush to announce solutions locks politicians into a vulnerable position. Attention 
quickly shifts to the costs, the problems and losers in any policy change, drown-
ing out the fundamental problem which is the basis of creating a shared sense of 
urgency.
The sense of urgency about Australia’s big reforms had many sources. For 
example:
Tariff reforms were built on the foundation of persistent messages over many •	
years from the antecedents of the Productivity Commission that tariffs were 
taxes on consumers and exporters, that competitiveness could not be sus-
tained that way, and that it could not save jobs. It took a while, but the pressing 
need for change eventually dawned. 
1980s tax reforms were built on the message that tax avoidance was rife and •	
the system could no longer be patched. Then, in 1998, the campaign towards 
a new tax system began with advertising and other messages that the old tax 
system was broken, all running before the GST and related reforms were even 
announced. 
A range of economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s were built on the reali-•	
sation that Australia was slipping down the relative income ladder among its 
international peers. A colourful illustration of the message was Paul Keating’s 
‘banana republic’ warning, but the message had been pursued in many other 
ways as well, including through economic summits. The urgency of this situa-
tion came to be widely shared.
The crisis in the perceived inadequacy of national savings underpinned several •	
other reforms. The sense of urgency was heightened by repeated messaging, 
including through a public inquiry on national savings. This was followed later 
by the powerful messages of the intergenerational reports (in itself a policy-free 
analysis) introduced by the Howard Government and continued since. These 
messages have variously supported wage restraint, the superannuation guar-
antee, and the establishment of the medium term fiscal framework. 
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There is a more overt political dimension to this as well, involving a different type of 
urgency. To cement its position, the Hawke Government faced an urgent political 
need to demonstrate economic policy credibility after the perceived shortcomings 
of the previous Whitlam Labor Government. The Howard Government faced a 
similar pressure based on disappointment over the limited reform record of previ-
ous Coalition governments. Fortunately for economic reform, the shared sense of 
political urgency that these leaders were able to build internally worked in paral-
lel with building a shared sense of urgency externally about Australia’s economic 
challenges. For a period, they combined to establish a reform culture (or assump-
tion) within the major political parties across Australia.
Stage 2: We need a strong leader – forming a 
powerful coalition
In recent years in Australia, there has been a tendency to personalise major 
reform proposals in two ways. First, personality politics has become even more 
dominant than in the past, with political agendas increasingly centralised around 
single leaders – prime ministers and premiers. Second, governments have often 
pursued the ‘authoritative leadership’ model in the design stage of reforms, such 
as giving expert (authority) personality to reforms called Bradley, Gonski, Garnaut 
or Henry.
The second stage in Kotter’s framework hints that this ten-
dency towards narrowing of the leadership model is almost 
certainly a mistake. We do not live in an era when politicians 
or experts are revered as authorities, and we have never 
lived in an era when broad system change leadership was 
delivered by individuals alone. On the contrary, effective 
major change leadership has always required a consider-
able body of leaders working together for a common cause 
– a powerful coalition. Many of these people can support 
and promote a reform issue, but not necessarily in ways that identify them with a 
person or a particular partisan agenda.
Personalising reform programs early can get in the way of building leadership •	
and subsequently building wider support. The tax reforms in the 1980s and the 
GST in 2000 generally were not called ‘Asprey reforms’ even though they were 
based on that report. Even the political labels of Hawke, Keating, Kennett, or 
Howard have generally been identified that way mainly in hindsight. It is prob-
ably no accident that one of the more widely supported reform ideas in recent 
times (notwithstanding concerns about its affordability), the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme (NDIS), is associated with no personal name and was devel-
oped instead by the relatively faceless Productivity Commission. The coalition 
of support for that reform is deep and wide.
“…personality politics has become 
even more dominant than in the past, 
with political agendas increasingly 
centralised around single leaders – 
prime ministers and premiers.”
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Reform governments generally worked through cabinets where cabinet min-•	
isters had voice and presence. They often had to persuade and enlist support 
even more widely. For example, in the 1980s much reform was first pursued 
through changing party platforms and through mechanisms like the Prices and 
Incomes Accord. A powerful advocate could be necessary, but never alone 
sufficient. Many leaders were necessarily engaged. 
Business, trade union leaders and a range of others were often key players in •	
the processes that ultimately brought reform. This could work at several stages. 
For example, the key options for tax reform in the early 1980s were first outlined 
in speeches by leading (Treasury) public servants and in conference papers 
by leading academics. They were then brought together in a draft white paper 
for discussion in the community and among business groups. A tax summit 
then followed, and then ultimately final decisions were taken after further time 
passed. Each stage brought a higher level of political identification and leader-
ship. Through this process not every potential leader grabbed the mantle, but 
many critical voices were given an opportunity to play a part in the required 
coalition of leadership. 
The persuasive role of the business sector Chairman (Stan Wallis) of the •	
1996–97 Financial System Inquiry and then subsequently the engagement of 
many participants in that process in implementing reforms (which also required 
state support) also illustrates the value of a broad leadership coalition. 
The strategy for the introduction of the GST is a further example. The GST was •	
made a core revenue stream for the states and territories, making all of them 
key participants in the leadership process. Its revenue purpose supported a 
new tax system directed at sustaining key public services (state health and 
education) as well as taking pressures off income taxes. 
Successful reform also requires building effective policy leadership and capability •	
within the public service. Short term processes like consultancies can contribute 
key insights but most major reforms are complex and require sustained leader-
ship over a long period of development and implementation. Standing capability 
and continuity of leadership is highly advantageous (see also stage 5). 
Stage 3: Why act now? Developing a change 
vision
Support for change requires that people clearly see the vision. The mistake here 
is to think that the vision is simply no more than the policy proposal itself. A com-
pelling vision is not a program, or an announcement, or a set of plans. Nor is it 
policy advertising (but we will discuss that in the next section).
It is much more. The vision goes beyond what is proposed to a clear sense of 
the reason, nature and plausibility of the change and the way it will all work in the 
future for those affected (even perhaps how it affects other things).
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There are limits to this. Sometimes, a part of the change will require some leap of 
faith. But usually the decision to jump requires considerable prior effort at building 
confidence about the secure ground on the other side.
A notable feature of a great deal of the successful Australian economic policy 
reform of the past 30 years is that it was typically catch-up change. For example, 
the Australian dollar was floated more than a decade after the US abandoned 
the fixed exchange system dating from the post-war Bretton-Woods agreement. 
Similarly, Australia’s GST was introduced several decades after most other devel-
oped countries had introduced broadly based consumption taxes. Few if any 
reforms did not have long established overseas counterparts. Moreover, many of 
them had long been the subject of considerable study and debate in Australia as 
well. The vision, in other words, was often readily enough to hand.
It is probably a bit harder now. We are being driven beyond catch up. The forces 
of change are less well charted – the shift to new developing economies and link-
ages, new demographic patterns and trends, and most of all new technologies 
addressing new needs and challenges. 
But the greater difficulty does not diminish the role of vision and its close cousin, 
strategy. This was met in relation to the major reforms to date through a number 
of key elements:
Development of many major reforms as substantial packages of measures •	
(particularly the tax and financial system reforms) that addressed social and 
economic goals and interests concurrently.
Building reforms through intergovernmental process such as those relating to •	
competition reform, where key stakeholder interests (including impacts on state 
finances) are comprehended and addressed.
Critical through this (and other reforms) has been the marrying of interests – for •	
example competition, competitiveness and consumer (cost of living) interests, 
and labour force flexibilities with employment growth and opportunities. Perhaps 
since the time that the dollar was floated, exposing a key instrument to market 
forces, Australian policy has focused on the consistent message that markets, 
given sound regulatory frameworks, and social aspirations can be mutually 
supportive. 
Establishing key narratives that ensure that various elements of reform are linked •	
to a cohesive vision for Australia. Important among these have been the ideas 
of engagement with newly emerging Asia, the international promotion of freer 
trade and investment, sustaining national savings and associated medium term 
fiscal disciplines, and the linking of horizontal equity and allocative efficiency 
tasks through ideas like broader tax bases facilitating lower tax rates. These 
analytical and narrative issues link also to the task of communication of the 
vision addressed in the next section.
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Stage 4: Why act ever? Communicating the 
change vision
Kotter and many others have observed that change failure very often is due to 
massively inadequate communication of the message. The problem is partly one 
of communication frequency, but also of effectiveness in the way the message is 
communicated.
Since we now live in an era that could almost be defined as the communication 
era – when communications have never been more highly developed, low cost 
and high speed – we need to recognise why this is still such a problem. That is 
a big subject, which can only be touched on briefly here. The problem now is 
that communication is so powerful that everyone can do it. A world of high com-
munication power has turned into a world of noise, and the problem is sustaining 
focus on what matters. In the face of that challenge, much of the mainstream 
media have turned to modes of communication that most political leaders have 
struggled to make work for them.
The critical need, at least in the beginning, is to communicate why a change is 
needed. Somehow, this seemed to work fairly well in the major reform exercises 
over the past 30 years. For sustained periods, leaders managed to maintain com-
munication intensity and focus on the main issues.
There were, and are many elements in this: the following are just a few examples. 
What they really amount to is recognition that major policy change needs its own 
communication strategies. These will likely look quite different to the communica-
tion strategies devoted to other purposes – like opposition politics, political brand 
or celebrity development or even policy and program advertising. 
Using the steps in an extended change process as communication opportu-•	
nities. The process of developing change can generate newsworthy material. 
Each step (policy conferences, summits, issue leadership campaigns, and 
negotiations to gain support) can be seen as important as a communication 
opportunity rather than as a threatening source of controversy or resistance. 
In the 1980s, the Labor Government often needed support under the Prices •	
and Incomes Accord or of its own party through changes to party platforms. 
These processes often generated discourses that pre-dated, but built support 
for, subsequent policy shifts. 
Coalition governments have often had analogous process demands. Seeking •	
support through party, business, and community structures provides positive 
communication potential – too often today this has been subordinated to central 
leadership dominance and truncated processes that rely on the unreliable chan-
nels of media management. 
Multiple channels with multiple voices. This is where broadening the leader-•	
ship coalition is an important complement to effective communication. Multiple 
voices are often seen as a threat to change, but particularly in the early stages 
of reform, when problems are being understood and voiced, an engaged role 
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for business, unions, independent academics and community groups can facili-
tate the communication task, provided there is a strategy in place to keep the 
discourse focused. That is where articulation of vision and strategy is vital, but 
no-one can expect this part to be easy. 
Stage 5: What’s in this for me? Empowering 
others to act
The first four stages correspond to those that Kotter sees as addressing resistance 
to change, but there is a need also to consider how success gets embedded and 
sustained in the initial months and years after the reform is launched. 
In particular, the fifth stage, empowering others to act, very quickly becomes 
vital and indeed it is critical that it is understood and anticipated in the process 
of building the entire change process. This is because this is the stage where 
change confronts new problems and new sources of resistance, and these will 
only be overcome if a broad range of new champions is in place with a strong 
interest in making things work.
We live in complex and highly networked societies. Very little is achieved in our 
societies without very widespread buy-in from all of the key actors affected by a 
major change. These people are empowered if they can see, or be provided with, 
a way of furthering their own careers and aspirations by acting on the opportu-
nities created by the change. This extends active participation well beyond the 
guiding coalition that was identified in stage 2.
An internationally open and competi-
tive economy is not ultimately made by 
politicians or bureaucrats – it is made 
by business organisations and their 
employees. Reformed taxes are made 
to work and fit into the fabric of busi-
nesses mainly by the businesses 
themselves (who calculate and pay 
nearly all taxes) and their professional 
advisers. Australia’s unique retirement income system meets the aspirations 
of savers and retirees only through the work by a large network of people and 
organisations working in the funds management and financial systems. Education 
reform, national disability insurance, privatised enterprises and infrastructure pro-
viders and everything else comes from the work of tens or hundreds of thousands 
of dedicated, professional people.
Successful change requires the engagement of these people. It requires exten-
sive work to ensure that they are empowered to participate in, and become 
an integral, self-leading part of the change process. Where they see problems, 
effective policymakers must join with them to find solutions. This is where change 
becomes much more than consultation – it becomes co-production.
“Critical to this is the bridge provided by the public service 
between political decision-making and the wider engagement 
in reforms by the community, including business and 
professional bodies. This is an important investment that was 
recognised in a number of Australia’s past reform programs.”
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Critical to this is the bridge provided by the public service between political 
decision-making and the wider engagement in reforms by the community, includ-
ing business and professional bodies. This is an important investment that was 
recognised in a number of Australia’s past reform programs.
When the GST was introduced, a major investment was made in assisting •	
small business to comply with the new systems. The Tax Office also made 
large capacity investments in systems and guidance provision, and these 
were matched by those across the private sector. A wide range of issues was 
addressed by a broadly based Tax Consultative Committee (and subsequently 
from 2000 the new Board of Taxation). At the intergovernmental level, standing 
arrangements and protocols of the Commonwealth and states were established 
to coordinate and problem solve as issues arose. State budgets were provided 
with a no-disadvantage guarantee and arrangements established to administer 
these effectively. 
While the GST (and broader New Tax System) reform was probably unmatched •	
in scale and breadth, the outreach elements in a number of other reforms have 
also been critically important – for example in introducing competition reforms 
and new market structures in privatised industries, the building of an open entry 
competitive banking system, the superannuation reforms and labour market 
reforms. Equally, examples of inatten-
tion to this stage have carried costs 
and sometimes led to reform setbacks. 
Attention must particularly be paid to 
the time and resources required to build 
knowledge and understanding among 
industries or other sectors affected by 
reform, to build systems and limit risks 
in the private sector. The tasks involved 
go beyond communication and consultation, often to co-design and co-pro-
duction at working levels typically below the radar of the political and media 
discourse. Perhaps the main ingredient is trust in decentralised processes.
“…the frequent calls for policy leadership often miss 
the key point. Yes, leadership is needed, and on rare 
occasions in the face of real crisis, strength of will alone 
may prevail. But only the right sort of leadership will 
consistently produce sustainable results.”
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Fitting it all together – connecting the stages
As a mid-sized economy in an ever-changing world, Australia will always face the 
need for reform. However, the frequent calls for policy leadership often miss the 
key point. Yes, leadership is needed, and on rare occasions in the face of real 
crisis, strength of will alone may prevail. But only the right sort of leadership will 
consistently produce sustainable results.
The evidence from organisation studies and from Australia’s own historical reform 
experience is that success most often requires a shared, multi-staged approach 
focused on addressing resistance and building support.
We have a well educated, motivated and diverse people that have proven their 
capacity to embrace change and build success with it. It is not surprising that a 
broad rather than narrow model of leadership works best in that setting. 
In organisational change, the order of the stages is often considered important 
(and notably that vision comes in the middle rather than the beginning). But 
that might not follow so clearly for the leadership of policy change. More likely, 
provided the sense of urgency about the problem is well established first, the 
remaining stages for policy reform may often merge together as mutually sup-
porting elements. Throughout, the emphasis must be on engaging broadly so 
that supportive leadership emerges from many sources to build understanding 
and acceptance strong enough to get the job done. 
The urgent search for effective change 
leadership
Unfortunately, this approach does not seem to fit the mythologies that have 
developed about how success was achieved in the past. These myths seem 
to under-rate the extraordinary efforts made to instil a sense of urgency, create 
leadership coalitions, to build a vision that could be the subject of repeated 
rounds of consistent and effective communication, and to ultimately empower 
large numbers of people to embed and build the change. Instead, the collective 
memory seems often to hold only one or two signature moments or individual 
performances, recalled repeatedly in the shorthand accounts of events so popular 
in the media today (and perhaps popular with some of those individuals as well).
The shorthand recollections have led to a number of shorthanded attempts at 
policy change in recent years. Many have fallen short of their goals. There is even 
greater concern, with some of those attempts coming unstuck, that the appetite 
for making any reform effort has waned. But Australia has the resources and the 
talents to take major reform seriously.
The urgent need to do so is rapidly building again.
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Increasing community expectations are again outpacing fiscal and productive 
capacities. We face heightened global mobility of entrepreneurship, capital and 
skilled labour; fast-breaking new technologies; and the inevitable ageing of the 
population. In the face of these threats and opportunities, the essential purpose 
of reform is to ensure that old ways do not act as brakes on Australia’s social and 
economic advance. 
With the need to deliver reform on several fronts, establishing the most effective 
change leadership framework is now itself an urgent challenge. 
The views expressed in this paper are the author’s alone and do not necessarily 
reflect those of any other person or organisation.
Endnotes
1  Watzlawick, Paul, Weakland, John; and Fisch, Richard; 1974: Change, Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution. W.W. 
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This chapter explores the policy changes that need 
to be considered if Australia is to capitalise on the 
potential of an agricultural boom as a result of the 
rising demand from Asia for agricultural exports.
3.  Challenges for  
northern Australia
 By David Farley
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Australia is on the cusp of an agricultural boom to rival the mining boom of 
the past two decades. Accelerating Asian demand has the potential to grow 
Australia’s agricultural exports from $10 billion to $25 billion by 2050.1
Yet the very scale of this boom puts at risk Australia’s ability to meet a more than 
doubling of demand from Asia.
Without an overarching agricultural policy similar to the United States’ Farm Bill 
of the mid 20th century or the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy 
of the last century, Australian agriculture will be unable to take the step change 
necessary to meet this rising demand. Such policies need to be wider than just 
domestic initiatives. The Asian food boom is a regional opportunity – or issue, 
depending on where you live – and demands a regional solution. Australia has 
been very successful with geo-political cooperation in the past, with bodies such 
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and cross-border crime 
fighting. Agriculture demands similar expansive thinking.
David Farley is the former Managing Director and Chief Executive 
Officer of the Australian Agricultural Company (AACo), the world’s 
biggest beef cattle company. Founded in 1824, AACo has 18 cattle 
stations in northern Australia, more than 670,000 cattle and exports 
more than $300 million worth of beef and live cattle annually.
David started his rural career as a jackaroo and was an independent 
Non-Executive Director of Tandou Limited and Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer 
of Colly Cotton Limited for a period of 16 years.
David has also held the role of Chief Executive Officer and President of Calcot (based in 
California, USA), as chairman of Rural Industries Research & Development Corporation, and 
is a former Director of Wool International. 
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The challenge for agriculture is to create the sense of urgency among Australia’s 
policymakers to bring about the national and regional solutions needed to engen-
der change. However, this sense of urgency will not come unless the urban 
demographic is educated, engaged and willing to support spending in areas far 
from their homes, for a national benefit they may not see for a decade or more.
The Federal Government’s Australia in the Asian Century white paper released 
during 2012 states that continuing population growth and rising living standards 
in Asia will see global food demand grow 70 per cent by 2050.2
The statistics around rising population and food demand are revealing. By 2050 
the world population will have grown by 40 per cent, much of it in Asia and the 
sub-continent. But with food demand rising by 70 per cent, and incomes rising 
by more than 200 per cent in the same period, a situation is being created where 
the increased population will no longer be satisfied with essentially a subsistence 
carbohydrate diet.
The rising middle class in Asia is demanding to eat further up the food chain 
with a more protein-rich diet. Specifically, a red-meat protein, given the rising 
Muslim population in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the entire ASEAN 
region. These middle-class families are demanding a better diet not just for taste 
or status, but because they recognise the part it plays in helping their children’s 
development at an early age.
Australia is perfectly placed to be the provider of much of that food. The nation 
has ample space, with more than four times the arable land of the US. We also 
have a tradition of innovative and productive agriculture and the proximity to Asia 
to allow for rapid delivery. Moreover in providing red-meat protein, we have a 
massive national cattle herd already established as an export industry.
However the scale of providing enough food for Asia in 2050 is currently beyond 
the capacity of Australia’s agricultural sector.
To meet this growing demand, Australia must nearly double its production of 
almost every export food commodity – from beef to wheat, dairy, fruit and sheep 
meat. The demand for an increased protein diet will force a change to the com-
position of Australia’s exports, from 48 per cent meat and 30 per cent cereals to 
52 per cent meat and 26 per cent cereals.3 
Given the nature of this demand, much of the supply will come from northern 
Australia, where the vast tracts of arable and grazing land are not only available, 
but close to the Asian supply chains that will need to be created or enhanced.
The ability to supply the ‘food boom’ in Asia is by no means guaranteed without 
the proper policy settings and structural conditions. The agricultural sector is 
not in a position to meet the scale demanded by the coming Asian demand. 
Agriculture does not just happen. It needs to be planned. Even the smallest pro-
ducers are planning years in advance – which crops will work, what preparation 
needs to be done to ensure a paddock is ready in two years time for them, what 
herd size is needed, with how many breeders, how to get the anticipated greater 
volume of produce to market? 
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The cattle industry has evolved to ensure the best possible position to meet the 
rising demand. In the past decade the industry has moved from a simple animal 
harvesting model, to a proper pastoral industry, putting breeding programs in 
place and implementing good business disciplines. This planning needs to be rep-
licated by policy setters, but at a much higher and long term level. The agricultural 
sector can manage its internal efficiencies, but many of the challenges the sector 
faces come from post-farm gate external pressures such as logistics bottlenecks 
and high energy costs. These are challenges that can only be resolved by gov-
ernment making and revising the right policy settings.
The issue for the agricultural sector is getting this message to the policy setters.
The necessarily fragmented nature of the agricultural sector, with a predominance 
of family ownership and a multitude of products means the sector lacks the 
champions the mining boom had. Nor is Government proving a champion itself. 
The sector has yet to see the same commitment from either side of politics, to 
that given to the mining sector as it ramped up production in the early part of this 
century. And with the nation already providing more than enough food to feed 
itself, the imperative to create long lasting and broad 
reform in the agricultural sector is less urgent.
The challenges of finding a champion for agriculture 
in the next 20 years is potentially as difficult as the 
challenges themselves. No longer is it acceptable 
for a government to pick an agriculture minister on 
the basis that they are a farmer.
They must have a broad range of attributes, 
including the gravitas and presence to be taken 
seriously on an international stage, have wide ranging knowledge and experience 
of international trade, tariffs and supply chain issues and be respected enough 
within their own cabinet to reach out across a range of ministries. Coming from 
the land would be a nice to have, but it is worth pointing out that one of the 
best recent advocates for Australian agriculture, former Trade and then Regional 
Development Minister Simon Crean, had no farming background. He made up for 
it by being trade-literate and respected in the region. In this way, Labor has often 
– not always – been better at picking agriculture ministers than the Coalition. Not 
having as many rural members means it cannot afford to be lazy and take the 
traditional or easy choice of the closest farmer.
The need for such a champion within Government – or at the very least, recogni-
tion of the supply challenges – is critical, because critical changes are needed. 
More money needs to be spent in northern Australia, on logistics, water infra-
structure and research and development. This is essential funding which will 
nevertheless have very little immediate – and more importantly, visible – impact 
on the urban democracy which is demanding better roads, hospitals and services 
for the outer suburbs of the south-eastern metropolises. It is apt to describe the 
urban demographic as an urban democracy because without their buy-in to the 
political process, the agricultural sector’s entreaties to the policy setters will never 
be taken as seriously as needed.
“…many of the challenges the sector faces 
come from post-farm gate external pressures 
such as logistics bottlenecks and high energy 
costs. These are challenges that can only be 
resolved by government making and revising 
the right policy settings.”
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Without activating, and more importantly, educating, this urban democracy, 
without creating the sense of urgency for change, agriculture in northern Australia 
will find itself behind the countries which do have the political will to invest in the 
policies and infrastructure needed to feed the fastest growing population in the 
history of the world.
What policy settings does Australia need to meet this demand? There are several 
critical initiatives needed to increase productivity, all of which need to be incorpo-
rated into a broad – and integrated – platform of reform.
Land use
More than 44 per cent of Australia’s mainland area is covered by pastoral leases, 
which are, in the words of a Productivity Commission review “characterised by 
extensive and prescriptive legislation and regulation”.4 
The commission went on to say: “The arrangements typically constrain the emer-
gence of non-pastoral land uses, and inhibit competition between pastoral and 
non-pastoral land uses. Further, the arrangements may increase the relative costs 
and risks of managing land for non-pastoral land uses and influence investment 
decisions. As a consequence, innovative land uses and potential economic and 
ecological gains, that could benefit land managers and the wider community, may 
be stifled.”
It is telling that the Productivity Commission review into pastoral leases is now 10 
years old – and still nothing substantive has been done. Allowing some pastoral 
leases to convert to freehold would have several benefits, not least the retire-
ment of government debt. It would also incentivise the landholder to create more 
improvements to a property, or to convert native pasture to feed cropping to grow 
a larger herd.
Similar incentives could be given without converting to freehold, such as 
recent changes to native vegetation clearing by the Queensland Government. 
Governments need to recognise that without significant change to land use regu-
lation, Australian agriculture will simply not have the physical capacity to supply 
Asia.
Water use, and more specifically, water infrastructure, is a perennial subject 
for policymakers; makers faced with the problem of how to energise northern 
Australia. Unfortunately, this subject is usually ‘solved’ by proposals to turn rivers 
inland or build more dams. These proposals – some of which have merit – are 
useless without being part of an integrated policy, one that is geared towards 
building infrastructure to serve Asian food demand, rather than building it to fulfill 
a pipe dream of a green inland that somehow magically produces food and fibre. 
The myriad of dam proposals for northern Australia do engage the urban democ-
racy with a Snowy Scheme romanticism, but on their own they do little to solve 
the issue of doubling production.
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Research and development
Australia has a rich history of research and development in the agricultural sector, 
dating back to iconic innovations such as the introduction of merino sheep and 
the invention of the stump-jump plough. Yet the scale and pace of research and 
development will have to dramatically increase if the sector is to reach the level 
of production needed to meet the growing 
Asian demand.
There is considerable private investment 
into research and development in the 
agricultural sector, but much of this is 
necessarily focused on bettering the indi-
vidual farm enterprise, rather than the wider 
sector. That is rightly the purview of gov-
ernments. However, agricultural research 
and development funding is another form 
of spending largely hidden from the urban 
democracy. The results are, if not intan-
gible to the city dweller, then often far in 
the future with no discernable return in the 
short run.
Policymakers need to recognise the importance not just of implementing and 
adequately funding agricultural research and development, but also of educating 
those who it will not directly benefit.
Logistics
Australia has an inherent geographic advantage for feeding Asia. Darwin is closer 
to Jakarta than it is to Brisbane, and shipping costs are far less for Australian 
exporters to reach Asia than they are for major competitors such as Brazil and 
the United States. However, the increased demand from Asia will place unprec-
edented stresses on northern Australia’s existing logistics networks.
Bottlenecks such as port facilities are easily identified. Less easily identified are 
areas such as bridges which will need to be strengthened to cope with increased 
road traffic, and the need for bitumen road access close to cattle mustering 
areas. 
Like much of the required investment in northern Australia, spending on logistics 
is not as visible to the population centres of south-eastern Australia, which have 
their own priorities for logistics and transport infrastructure. 
“…agricultural research and development funding is 
another form of spending largely hidden from the urban 
democracy. The results are, if not intangible to the city 
dweller, then often far in the future with no discernable 
return in the short run. 
“Policymakers need to recognise the importance not 
just of implementing and adequately funding agricultural 
research and development, but also of educating those 
who it will not directly benefit.”
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Trade agreements
The failure to secure free trade agreements with major Asian trading partners 
such as the Republic of Korea and Japan are in the short term, more damaging 
to Australia’s ability to feed Asia than building the necessary internal structures.
Australia’s beef industry is losing close to $2.5 million every week due to the 
failure to secure a free trade agreement with Korea. The United States, which 
signed an agreement two years ago, is rapidly taking up market share from supe-
rior Australian product as its tariff declines while Australia’s stays high and static. 
Because the US tariff keeps reducing to zero over a 16 year period, this loss 
will grow every year. Impact analysis by Meat and Livestock Australia estimates 
Australia’s market share in Korea will more than halve by 2018.5 
The proposed Australia/Korea free trade agreement has stalled over one clause 
– Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) that governs rights to legal action over 
sovereign risk – a right the Government fears will lead to litigation over tobacco 
plain packaging legislation. It is a clause Australia has previously agreed to, and 
can be limited in any case by subsequent clauses. 
It is a case of Australia suborning the interests of generating and stimulating agri-
cultural commerce to base political considerations. There are similar problems 
with Japan, where trade talks stalled over 
car import tariffs. In this case, the Australian 
Government is using an efficient northern 
cattle industry to subsidise an inefficient 
southern auto manufacturing industry. 
It is a case that demonstrates the challenge of 
energising and stimulating northern Australia 
without the support of the southern urban 
democracy. Without a public educated on 
the need for feeding Asia, the imperative for 
good free trade agreements is lost on the 
policymakers.
Attracting capital
Government free trade initiatives should extend to providing the incentives and 
tax structures needed to attract capital – both foreign and domestic – into the 
agricultural sector. Foreign capital has been unfairly demonised by both sides of 
politics, but is, and has been, essential to the development of Australia’s agricul-
tural industry. The Australian Agricultural Company was itself founded by foreign 
capital out of London in 1824, and is still well supported by foreign investors 
wanting exposure to Australian agriculture.
“Without a public educated on the need for feeding 
Asia, the imperative for good free trade agreements is 
lost on the policymakers.
“Government free trade initiatives should extend to 
providing the incentives and tax structures needed to 
attract capital – both foreign and domestic – into the 
agricultural sector.”
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Attracting and keeping capital in agriculture, with its long term horizons, is a 
challenge in the short term focused market. The once traditional ways of attract-
ing capital such as tariff barriers are no longer appropriate in a global market. 
Instead, governments should review and restructure tax incentives, based on the 
experiences of the past decade, to ensure effective investment for the future. It is 
notable that the Coalition has gone some way towards this by proposing differ-
ent tax treatments for northern Australia, although the original policy lacked detail 
and was focused on regional towns, rather than an all-encompassing agricultural 
policy.
Food aid
One of the most compelling ways of educating the public on the need for agri-
cultural reform in northern Australia is the role food, and food aid, can play in 
international diplomacy. It is often surprising how few people can have such 
incredible leverage on diplomacy. Simply put, if you are helping feed a country, 
diplomacy automatically becomes easier.
One of the achievements of the US foreign aid program has been to link aid with 
its Farm Bill. The US keeps a revolving three-year supply of food ready to provide 
to countries facing humanitarian crises. Rather than appear with a multi-million 
dollar cheque – as Australia often does – the US provides tangible food aid in 
the form of bags of rice, or tins of peaches, or tinned beef, all stamped with “Gift 
of the United States”. It is an effective way of not just providing aid to those who 
need it, but also going some way to eliminating the risk of corruption when cash 
is provided instead of goods.
Recent suggestions to use live export cattle as food aid from Australia have merit. 
However, under a revolving food bank structure, cattle (and other agricultural 
commodities) could be 
purchased during times of 
drought and oversupply 
and stockpiled for use in 
the future. The recent pro-
posals to help alleviate the 
drought are haphazard, and 
while they may help some 
Australian farmers, an imme-
diate supply of live export 
cattle to Indonesia may have 
the effect of not meeting their demand, or upsetting delicate trade negotiations. 
Better to process the food and ‘bank’ it, ready for use when needed.
“Rather than appear with a multi-million dollar cheque – as Australia 
often does – the US provides tangible food aid in the form of bags of rice, 
or tins of peaches, or tinned beef, all stamped with ‘Gift of the United 
States’. It is an effective way of not just providing aid to those who need 
it, but also going some way to eliminating the risk of corruption when 
cash is provided instead of goods.”
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Education
The best infrastructure plans in the world will do nothing for Australian agricul-
ture if the urban democracy does not understand the need for them. The Federal 
Government’s recent National Food Plan goes some way to providing for more 
education funding, but there is a vast gulf between the very worthy kitchen garden 
programs, and teaching the urban democracy about the need for better ports 
and roads. It is a challenge to convince someone sitting in a Sydney traffic jam of 
the need to spend hundreds of millions on country roads outside Darwin.
Educating the urban democracy about the need for better infrastructure and 
supply challenges is not something that can be achieved with a simple govern-
ment program. It is a challenge that requires a whole of government approach, 
a commitment to selling agriculture and its benefits to the economy at every 
opportunity.
Conclusion
The leverage that such a small sector of the economy – in per capita terms – can 
have on commerce and diplomacy is incredible, and humbling for those who work 
in it. However it is leverage that is at risk of being underutilised as our nearest 
neighbours expand their populations and demand for better food.
Australia needs to be part of the global market, not a consequence of it, and 
under the current policy settings Australian agriculture is already at risk of falling 
behind those nations with integrated agricultural policies.
Australian agriculture recognises that it is not the role of governments to create 
food, or to open up new markets. That is rightly the role of the thousands of 
talented people who work in the sector. It is the role of government to create the 
right structures to stimulate investment in agriculture, to create the level playing 
fields in international commerce so our products can compete. Australia has pre-
viously been very successful in creating and supporting international trade bodies 
such as the G20 and the Pacific Rim trading bloc. The next government should 
seriously investigate a geo-political solution, an ASEAN agricultural body focused 
on feeding Pacific Rim nations, one that can fund the research and development 
needed to increase agricultural output in those countries which can provide a 
food surplus for the rest of the region.
It is critical that Australia takes the lead and moves out of the current paradigm of 
unilateral thinking, recognising that this is a regional issue. 
Meeting Asian demand for high-quality food is an imperative, not just for com-
merce but for diplomacy. The long term nature of agriculture demands that the 
reform needed must begin now, to anticipate the demand rather than react to it.
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Case Study 1 
Bob Hawke
This is an excerpt of an interview with the Hon. Bob 
Hawke AC GCL, former prime minister of Australia 
(1983–1991) conducted by CEDA in May, 2013. 
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the Hon. bob Hawke Ac gcl was prime minister of Australia from 1983 to 1991. After 
graduating from the University of Western Australia, he won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford 
University. He resigned from Parliament in February 1992, having been Australia’s longest 
serving Labor PM.
CEDA members have expressed concern about the quality of public policy 
setting, do you agree there has been a change in its quality? 
Bob Hawke: Yes, I do. I think there is an increasing tendency to, if not be gov-
erned, certainly to be influenced in approaches by opinion polls. And I find this 
basically repugnant because leadership is about leading, not following, and that 
doesn’t mean you don’t listen to what’s being said, but I think leaders have a 
responsibility to shape public understanding. 
It goes back to the basic belief I’ve had for as long as I can remember, and that is 
ignorance is the enemy of good policy. It’s a fundamental truth, I think, of politics, 
and so that’s why…in the process of becoming leader, I promised the Australian 
people I would hold a national economic summit. 
Could you elaborate on the difference between leading and following?
Bob Hawke: Leaders should be about analysing and understanding what the 
current situation is, understanding what the changing factors within your own 
country and exogenously, which are going to affect the welfare of your country. 
Understanding those facts, it should then be about leading the people to under-
stand the changes that are necessary to optimise your performance. 
Following is just, in the crassest form, listening to opinion polls and getting some-
thing sort of run from radio jocks or other so-called opinion formers and just giving 
into them. That’s following.
You commented that ignorance is the enemy of good policy. Could you 
elaborate? 
Bob Hawke: If people either do not understand what the facts are or believe in 
some set of beliefs which are obviously wrong, I mean, then the chance of leaders 
being able to implement policy are reduced. The obverse of the proposition is the 
important thing is that if you educate your population about what the challenges 
are, what needs to be done, then you optimise your chance of actually bringing 
about those policies. 
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In the major reforms that you introduced, which fundamentally transformed 
Australia, there was considerable bipartisan support. Is that important for 
public policy? 
Bob Hawke: Well, it’s obviously desirable, if you can get bipartisan support and 
there was a measure of bipartisan support, but certainly not for all the things we 
did. That sort of bipartisan support obviously makes it easier, but it’s not abso-
lutely essential.
Did you cultivate that support explicitly? 
Bob Hawke: I tried to, not just within the political, but within the economic frame-
work. By the time I was prime minister, in a sense, I had as good relations with 
the business community as I did with the trade union movement. They respected 
me and I respected a lot of their leaders and they cooperated very much in the 
economic summit I held. 
How valuable is it for a leader to have a strong vision for where they want to 
take the economy and for the changes that need to be made?
Bob Hawke: In a sense you are putting the cart before the horse. The first thing to 
do is to understand what has been happening, and the changes that are occur-
ring both, as I say, within your own economy and exogenously. And then out of 
that understanding, you should be able to shape vision, if you want, or your idea, 
policies, about what needs to be done to optimise your economic performance. 
But underlying it all is getting understanding of the public, and as we did through 
the economic summit, through the organisations representing various aspects of 
public life. So we had large employers, small employers, state governments, local 
governments, churches, charitable organisations, and I told the Treasury that 
every delegate there had to have as full a briefing about the state of the economy 
and the situation as we were given when we came in. It meant that by the time we 
actually held the summit, everyone there knew what the facts were and that’s why 
we were able to get a unanimous communiqué. Apart from Joh Bjelke-Petersen. 
Can we talk for a minute about the values and ideologies of a leader and how 
relevant they are to policy?
Bob Hawke: Yes, well, I don’t think a leader should be bound by a theory of 
socialism for instance, or something like that. You must have certain basic values. 
They are what allow you to prioritise actions. 
I’m a great believer in the fair go syndrome in Australia. I think it’s important in 
our lives. It simply means that you’re not going to have equal outcomes from an 
education process, but you’re going to have equal opportunity. 
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Do you think part of the problem is the pace and complexity of issues that get 
presented to government has changed? 
Bob Hawke: I suppose it is true that in some senses, issues are more complex. 
But knowledge has increased too. I mean, it’s not as though in regard to most of 
the issues and problems we’ve got that we don’t know what to do. 
It’s the lack of will which is the problem, and leadership. 
Has there been a change in the role of the public service since you worked 
with them?
Bob Hawke: I think different leaders use the public service differently. I mean, in 
a constitutional sense, there’s been no change. Whether there’s a change or not 
depends on the attitude of the prime minister of the day. I personally found the 
public service a very capable and useful instrument.
How did you approach using that instrument?
Bob Hawke: Well, at the first meeting I had with the heads of department, I said I 
expected that in line with the Westminster tradition that they would accept there’d 
been a change of government and that they would now loyally seek to give effect 
to the policies of the newly elected government. I said, there’s one thing I want to 
say at the outset – I do not want to be receiving advice from any of you or those 
under you on the basis of what you think I want to hear. I said, I want what you 
think not what you think I want to hear. 
In your experience, then, what would have influenced you not to use the white 
and green paper processes?
Bob Hawke: Oh, I mean, there are some circumstances in which a white paper 
or a green paper make sense. I’m not saying that the concept is bad, but in the 
end, you’ve got to make your judgements, and if a white paper is going to help 
you understand the thing better and going to help others understand it, okay, but 
it can take a long time and not result in anything meaningful. It can produce funny 
results. 
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Bob Hawke: No. I just get back to the basic points I’ve made, mate, and that is 
that there’s a tendency to, I think, overcomplicate these issues. As I keep saying, 
a lot of it is not rocket science, it’s just plain, good common sense, I think a great 
deal of it, is treating people decently and in a way which is going to extract the 
very best out of them. But as the prime minister, you’ve got an obligation to lead 
if you’re going to be a more effective leader. The more effective you will be will 
come from how much more you get out of those you’re leading, so that’s not 
rocket science. 
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Case Study 2 
John Howard
This is an excerpt of an interview with the  
Hon. John Howard, OM AC SSI, former prime 
minister of Australia (1996–2007) conducted by 
CEDA in May, 2013. 
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Do you think it is accurate, that there has been a decline in the quality of public 
policy here in Australia?
John Howard: I’m critical of the quality of public policy over the last five years. 
You might expect me to say that, but it’s true. It has declined. We haven’t had any 
serious economic reforms. 
What are the key attributes of successful leadership?
John Howard: Well, everybody looks at this differently, but the first thing is you’ve 
got to have a strong set of convictions and values. You’ve got to be a good lis-
tener, but also you’ve got to be a person that once you’ve listened, you then 
resolve to go ahead. You’ve got to have good relations with your people imme-
diately around you, and you’ve got to understand that successfully implementing 
public policy changes is a combination of ideology and realism. You can’t do 
things unless you’re in government, but if you only worry about being in govern-
ment, you don’t do anything.
Could you discuss the tension between pragmatic implementation of policy 
and the values that underpin those policies? 
John Howard: In politics, you need to be in government to implement things. The 
phrase I used often is “it is better to be 80 per cent pure in government than 125 
per cent pure in opposition.”
But I used 80 per cent very deliberately. You had to maintain the central features 
of good policy. You have to compromise at the edges to get it through. 
There’s a tension between values and ideology on the one hand, and political 
advantage on the other. It’s always been there and the successful government 
achieves both. 
The mandate principle has been suggested as a necessary ingredient for eco-
nomic reform. Do you agree? 
John Howard: It’s a theory of government. There is a theory that you have good 
government when you tell the public in advance what you’re going to do, and that 
if people vote for you, that gives you a certain moral authority to implement what 
you’ve done. Now, it’s a good idea too, if you’re going to undertake significant 
economic reform to tell the public in advance what you’re going to do. Although 
that’s not a necessary precondition. The Hawke Government didn’t say it was 
going to float the dollar, but it didn’t matter, because the opposition supported it.
the Hon. John Howard oM Ac ssi is Australia’s second longest serving prime minister, 
having held that position from March 1996 until November 2007.  He led the Liberal Party 
of Australia for more than 16 years.  
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Yes. Can we talk about the GST and talk about that as an example of how you 
introduced a very difficult reform, or how you built a coalition for reform?
John Howard: One of the ways that we were able to do it, one of the reasons 
we were able to do it is that it’s a debate that the Australian community had been 
fitfully involved in for a long period of time. We had a big debate in 1993, when 
John Hewson put out Fightback!, which was a very good policy; very good policy. 
Unfortunately, the Labor Party ran a very effective fear campaign against it and 
the then prime minister proved a better campaigner when it came to fear than 
John Hewson. I don’t think he won a lot of credit policy-wise, because after all, 
he’d originally supported a broad-based consumption tax, and it’s a bit hard when 
you’ve supported it to then have a different position. 
But if you come forward to 1996/97, one of the ways that we were able to get 
it up was that we did spend a lot of time trying to enlist or I guess to at least 
neutralise opposition from some of the welfare and other community groups that 
had a historic antipathy to consumption taxes, because they thought they were 
regressive. We got the business community talking about it and talking to some 
of the welfare groups, so it meant that when we launched it, people were at least 
familiar with the arguments and that helped them, and if we didn’t get people 
onside, it neutralised their opposition. 
I always encouraged people in the business community who wanted certain eco-
nomic changes to argue the case. 
Can you talk a little bit about the role of a leader in terms of convincing the 
party to introduce and accept substantial reforms?
John Howard: Oh, it’s absolutely critical and you’ve got to have a willingness to 
argue the case, but the first group that you’ve got to get onside is your cabinet. 
And if you can get the great bulk of your cabinet onside, you have a flying start 
in getting the party room onside, because it’s very rare that the party room com-
pletely disregards the view of all the senior members of the cabinet. 
There’s nothing fancy about this. It’s a question of personal persuasion and the 
leader plays a very big role because it’s the leader that carries the main weight 
of public debate, although obviously when you’re talking about economics, the 
treasurer has a big role in it. But the whole tone and pace of the thing is set, and if 
the leader is known to believe very strongly in something, then that carries a lot of 
weight. I was known to believe very strongly in tax reform, believe very strongly in 
industrial relations reform, waterfront reform, and privatisation. They were things 
that I had built form on in the 1980s when we were in opposition, so when people 
thought about me and policy, they thought, “well, he’s in favour of this and this 
and this and this, and he’s been arguing those things for years”. They weren’t 
things that I suddenly produced. It’s much harder for a leader to suddenly out of 
the blue say, “well, look, I’m now in favour of doing this and I want you to follow 
me”, if you’ve never talked about or argued the case for them in the past. None of 
the things that I championed on the economic reform front as prime minister were 
blinding revelations to my colleagues. 
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Are there any elements of an effective reform process that you think need to 
be in place to actually get them successfully adopted and implemented?
John Howard: You first believe in it yourself. You’ve got to have somebody in 
the government, but particularly the prime minister and the senior minister in the 
area who actually believes in the reform, and if somebody doesn’t really believe in 
something, it’s very hard to get it done. Conviction is the first element of success-
ful reform. Then you’ve got to take your own party and the people immediately 
around you with you. The relationship between the leader and the immediately 
led is very important in the political environment, as it is in a military environment. 
This idea that you can do these things almost in isolation is nonsense. You have 
to take people immediately around you with you.
You need, obviously, to have the support of the public, the professional public 
service. You shouldn’t underestimate that. I don’t believe in governments being 
run by the public service, but you can’t run a government without the public 
service. And having a good relationship between the government of the day and 
the public service is very important. 
How did you create a sense of urgency around the need to introduce a 
reform? 
John Howard: I think urgency’s the wrong word. I don’t think people felt it was 
urgent in the sense that we were going to collapse if we didn’t have it. We were 
able to create the impression in the community that the current taxation system 
was no longer strong enough and effective enough for the welfare of the country, 
that we needed a big change and that the change we proposed was fair and 
would leave Australia in a stronger position. You can normally sell reform to the 
public if you satisfy two conditions. The first is that it’s for the betterment of the 
country and the second condition is that it’s fundamentally fair and it’s not going 
to unduly hurt a particular section of society. If you can persuade people of those 
two things, they’ll normally support it.
Are there any other major shifts in the nature of politics or political debate that 
you have observed over that timeframe?
John Howard: The biggest single change in that 40 years is that there’s no longer 
any serious thought stream in Australia in favour of greater government involve-
ment, or in favour of the command economy approach. That’s a result of the end 
of the Cold War and the total disintegration of the economies of Eastern Europe. 
I entered parliament in 1974, and there was still a serious body of opinion in the 
world that the command economy approach would work, or was at least as good 
as the capitalist approach. And that’s all gone.
The other big change is that the government no longer has a monopoly of the 
raw materials of the debate. They’re the two big changes.
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This is an excerpt of an interview with the Hon. Nick 
Greiner AC, former premier of New South Wales 
(1988–1992), conducted by CEDA in May, 2013. 
Case Study 3 
Nick Greiner 
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Do you agree with CEDA members that there has been a decline in the quality 
of public policy debate in Australia? 
Nick Greiner: Absolutely, but it is a universal phenomenon, not just limited to 
Australia. 
I think the reasons are due to the changing nature of the media cycle, the nature 
of social media and its pervasiveness, the use of public opinion polling, all of that 
sort of thing. It is made even more difficult in Australia because of relative absence 
of think tanks and the independent, objective or otherwise, institutions who see 
their role not as lobby groups, but as promoting particular reform ideals. 
How has the media cycle damaged the nature of quality public policy debate? 
Nick Greiner: I think it means that it’s much harder. Everything’s more immediate, 
so you tend to get issues cut off.  The normal media advice in Australia is, don’t 
give an issue any oxygen, don’t encourage or allow a debate, just kill it. That is 
what tends to happen. The motivation is that if an issue is not quickly kill it can 
run away from you, both by the media and by social media. 
There is no longer an opportunity to develop an idea or argument. What’s lacking 
is time.
We’ve also strengthened the political parties in Australia recently. The capacity 
for individual members of parliament to advocate positions separate from their 
parties is extraordinarily limited. This limits the success of conviction politicians. 
You do not find those who come with a clearly developed view as to what ought 
to happen, or what they want to do. It tends to be far more reactive, far more 
responsive to reviews and enquiries and the issues of the day rather than originat-
ing from the leader.
Was there any particular style or approach to leadership that you adopted 
when you stepped into the role?
Nick Greiner: Probably the wrong one. I had a clear view, a series of policies that 
broadly cascaded down from a view of state government as being about busi-
ness and wanting to run things in a rational business like way. 
the Hon. nick greiner Ac  was Premier and Treasurer of New South Wales from  
1988 to 1992. Since his retirement from politics he has been heavily involved in the 
corporate world as chairman of several large companies and as the deputy chairman and 
director of others.
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My tenure was a little unusual in that it wasn’t on the back of a crisis. The normal 
change management advice is that people don’t like change. They need to under-
stand why change, significant change, is necessary or appropriate. Therefore it is 
easier if you come in after an absolute crisis. 
So it’s the Rahm Emanuel comment about never waste a good crisis. But if you 
don’t have a good crisis, you need to create the imperative for change. 
How do you go about ensuring that the beneficiaries of change understand 
what you’re doing?
Nick Greiner: That is difficult. Part of the problem is that we tend to start off with a 
view that some things are self-evident. You really need to start with the outcomes 
and work backwards. We tend not to do that because the people in the process 
are in the process, so they’re more interested in the process. If they are interested 
in tax reform, well, the question is, why do you have tax reform? It’s not just so 
some people will have an extra dollar in their pay packet, although that may be 
a reason at a certain point in time. So I think you need a real outcome focus and 
then work back. 
If you don’t get agreement and a buy in on the outcome, then you just get buried 
in the usual vested interest, whether they’re levels of government, lobby groups, 
interest groups, old people, young people, whatever it may be. So I think that’s 
the paramount thing. 
How would you go about doing that? 
Nick Greiner: I think change management at a corporate level, which is now quite 
a sophisticated activity, probably is a useful lead. It is not as easy for governments 
as the capacity to execute, or the length of time, is not as conducive as it is in the 
corporate world. 
That is interesting as, historically, the majority of change management pro-
grams have failed. 
Nick Greiner: Yes, I think they’re a little better now because they do a much better 
job of dissecting, identifying the stakeholders and getting appropriate champions. 
So change often comes from the group rather than being done to people. 
It’s harder in government except if you have a clear problem. If you’re in Spain and 
there’s 25 per cent unemployment, then doing something is acceptable. Even if 
people aren’t confident, they know the status quo is unacceptable. 
The difficulty is that in a country like Australia, the status quo’s not unacceptable, 
it’s just not optimal. And I think that’s the fundamental problem, that our situation 
is not too bad. The lucky country syndrome. 
I think that’s the framework within which there is reform fatigue in Australia, 
because you’re backing against a perception that things really aren’t too bad.
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Can we discuss the concept of the electoral mandate?
Nick Greiner: It is interesting that at the moment that the mandate has had a 
revival. A lot of the governments today in Australia have a very clear view that they 
want to keep every promise and that they don’t accept John Keynes’ argument 
that, you know, when circumstances change, I change my mind. 
The problem tends to be that in the lead up to elections oppositions will say what-
ever they need to say in order to win. So they will rule out most forms of change 
because, they figure, it is subject to scare campaigns and so on 
I think we’re in a period where maybe getting a mandate is the popular tactic for 
getting reform, but it does presume that reform is capable of explanation and that 
explanation doesn’t preclude you from getting elected. 
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This is an excerpt of an interview with the Hon. Jeffrey 
Kennett AC, former premier of Victoria (1992–1999) 
conducted by CEDA in May, 2013. 
Case Study 4 
Jeff Kennett 
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the Hon. Jeff Kennett Ac was the 43rd Premier of Victoria between 1992 and 1999. He is 
founding Chairman of beyondblue, a national depression initiative. He was President of 
Hawthorn Football Club from 2005 to 2011. 
Do you think there is an issue with the quality of the public policy debate in 
Australia? 
Jeff Kennett: Yes. The reasons it is an issue is that the political cycle is too short; 
the influence of the media on good policy is not conducive to its delivery; most 
politicians, as an organised group belonging to a political party, don’t have long 
term visions, and therefore they’re focused on the now rather than tomorrow.
These issues have become worse. What’s changed is that the media, the quality 
of politicians, and the development over the last 20 years of a society based on 
entitlement rather than self-reliability.
The media reinforces the instantaneous nature of life today. This doesn’t give 
people time to reflect and consider. Politicians are fundamentally too weak to 
resist the pursuit of popularity and the pressures that come from the media. 
How did you approach that leadership style when you were Premier?
Jeff Kennett: No differently than I would approach leadership of any organisation. 
Leadership is not difficult, but it does require resolve and it does require a sense 
of where you’re going. It requires you to assemble around you people that have 
the skills that you don’t have; it requires the development of the strategy to deliver 
the vision; it requires consistency of advocacy, and then you need to be able to 
demonstrate the benefits of what you’ve been articulating.
Those benefits, at the political level will be an improvement in the environment 
in which we live. If you’re in commerce, it might be judged as profitability. For a 
football club, it might be winning premierships. 
Could you talk a bit more on political will and vision? 
Jeff Kennett: What I mean is if you’ve correctly identified where you’re trying to 
take the country or the state through a long term vision, you need to get the 
people around you, and put in the strategies to deliver that vision. There may 
be some speed bumps along the way but those need to be addressed, but 
they should not divert you from the main task, which is to deliver the long term 
objective. 
Where you have no long term objective and you only work from day to day worry-
ing about opining polls or anything else, then you are buffeted by whoever makes 
the most noise. 
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Do you think the cabinet is important?
Jeff Kennett: Absolutely, it was a lesson I learnt in my army days. You can have 
the best general on the field, but if he doesn’t have troops under him and they 
don’t have a good relationship and they don’t work together, you can’t win any-
thing. So no one on their own wins. A premier doesn’t win alone, the leader of a 
football club, a player, a not-for-profit, no one on their own delivers – only teams 
deliver. 
I’ve always said you only need six good ministers to run a state government and 
eight to run a federal government. I was fortunate as I had those six people plus 
a few more.
How did you go about developing that long term vision?
Jeff Kennett: Well, the members of the cabinet worked hard together for 10 years 
before being elected in 1992. From when I was elevated to the leadership in ’82, 
we kept reviewing our policies. Every time we lost an election we kept refreshing 
those policies. 
I think the public needs to know where you want to end up. I don’t think they 
necessarily need to know all the details of how you’re going to get there. Where 
do you want to lead Australia? Where do you want Australia to be in 2050? The 
public don’t want to cross every T and dot every I. They just want you to govern, 
they expect you to govern. They want a government of adults, not of bloody 
children. They want a government that will give them certainty as to how they 
manage and live their lives. So whether people agree with us or not, they all knew 
where we were heading. 
You talk about the importance of governing, then – is that about making those 
day-to-day decisions?
Jeff Kennett: Well, the day-to-day decisions are focused on the unexpected that 
happens in any period of time. But they should not divert you from the broader 
long term strategy. So the day-to-day issues are often not about the broader fun-
damental strategy. 
You can try and consult, but it’s often a waste of time, waste of effort, waste of 
energy. You’re elected to govern – govern.
Would you suggest that governments should introduce a lot more reforms 
immediately rather than through consultative processes?
Jeff Kennett: It depends on what the reform is. If you make a decision that you’re 
going to make change, why do you then spend a year or two talking about it? Do 
it. Life’s short. 
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This is an excerpt of an interview with the Hon. Steve 
Bracks AC, former premier of Victoria (1999–2007) 
conducted by CEDA in April, 2013. 
Case Study 5 
Steve Bracks 
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Do you agree with CEDA members that there has been a decline in the quality 
of public debate in Australia? 
Steve Bracks: There is no question that there has been a decline. It is much less 
about long term issues and much more focused on immediate or medium term 
issues. There is too much of an emphasis on personalities and their positions 
rather than the issues. There are ways to address that. 
What are the factors driving this?  
Steve Bracks: The 24 hour media cycle is one. It has a much more immediate 
impact than it previously had. When I left office in 2007, you could do one media 
conference a day. You could do one story for the newspapers the night before. 
You could develop policy and release that policy in a timely way. 
Now, with the wear and tear on governments with the constant media cycle it is a 
much more difficult process and the utility value of government has been reduced 
as a result. I think governments do not know how to respond to the issue, which 
is one of the reasons why I think that immediate hits are currently much more 
important than longer term benefits. 
Governments do not have to respond. They need to learn that they do not have 
to respond to the constant media cycle. You do not have to be a commentator 
on every issue of the day. You can be out and commenting when you have some-
thing to say which is about the real policy direction you want to pursue or there is 
an announcement that you want to make. 
Did you adopt a particular style when approaching the task of leading Victoria? 
Steve Bracks: Yes. I adopted the Hawke view of the supremacy of cabinet, being 
the chairman of the board rather than the executive officer. Enabling your minis-
ters to pursue their portfolios and policies in relation to the commitments we had 
made, interfering only when there is failure. 
the Hon. steve bracks Ac entered Parliament as the Member for Williamstown in 1994. 
He became Victoria’s 44th Premier in October 1999 after serving as a Shadow Minister in 
the Employment, Industrial Relations and Treasury portfolios.
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Additionally, we built an apparatus in government that enabled us to operate 
effectively by having some of the best policy skills we could find. That meant staff-
ing up the central agencies, Premier and Cabinet and Treasury but particularly 
Premier and Cabinet. This involved having significant policy capacity, to be over-
seen by the Policy and Strategy Committee of Cabinet, and to commission work. 
We actively recruited the best people we could because the quality of the public 
sector was very important. 
Having a focus on it, having a determination to do it was necessary to develop 
the proposals that eventually made up the latest round of the National Reform 
Agenda. It was deliberative from our point of view. 
The principle of my government was that I asked, through our Policy and Strategy 
Committee of Cabinet, for our departmental advisors to commission reports on 
where we could seek to improve our economic position. Out of that process 
came proposals for a National Reform Agenda. 
Do you believe that this is the action that needs to take place prior to any 
reform agenda being implemented? 
Steve Bracks: What often happens, particularly at a state level, is that the central 
agencies are diminished in their policy capacity over time. They see it as a less 
important priority than other parts of government. When we got to government 
in 1999 we had a strong Treasury, some effective policy development and robust 
organisation. There was a weak central agency in Premier and Cabinet. All it was 
doing was putting additional coordinating comments on stuff that other depart-
ments were doing. But no proactive policy development in policy work for the 
government. 
What we did was change that. You need to get the structures right or else there 
is no point. This commitment led us to adopt significant policy development pro-
cesses within government.  Not only did we have the commitments that every 
government makes on approaching government, the platform, but I saw policy 
as something you had to continuously work on and have a process for in govern-
ment. So for example, I developed a Policy and Strategy Committee in Cabinet 
which simply talked about the forward direction of the government and the policy 
development of the government. 
The Federal Government always has the capacity to develop policy and under-
take this work. It is a matter of the political will to achieve it. At any one point the 
Commonwealth has the capacity to gear up on this. The public service is just 
waiting. All that is needed is political will.  
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You described the political will required to establish ongoing policy setting. 
Why do you think that is important? 
Steve Bracks: All governments come into office from opposition. Coming into 
office you do so with a set of policies that you determine and derive from your 
values, from the alternatives that exist. So you come into power with that and that 
is your forward thrust and what is reinterpreted by the public service as programs 
and policies. 
But my view was that in government you had to replenish policy by using the 
apparatus of government to do it. The whole government is a tool available to do 
it. Now my view is that tool is often underutilised. 
I saw the longevity of our government being dependent on using that apparatus 
of government to develop good policy. That is why effectively, I replaced the work 
we did in opposition with interest groups and stakeholders and the party appara-
tus with a structured approach as I have described already. 
How important is the mandate that you bring to government? 
Steve Bracks: Extremely important. The mandate is a minimum. What you 
propose while in opposition and what you say you will do during an election is a 
minimum of what you should attempt to implement. But policy development does 
not stop with the mandate that you are elected on. That is a minimum but if you 
are static then you are only delivering what was relevant to yesterday. 
I have always said that policy development is not about commentary on the 
current issues, which is what policy can often devolve into. It is the offer for the 
next four years or the next 10 years. If you are not thinking of that time frame then 
you are just acting as a commentator like everyone else. 
It is not policy work on what is happening now but on what should be happen-
ing over that period that should represent their electoral mandate. Therefore, in 
getting into government, all you have done is get in on a set of retrospective poli-
cies that you have developed and then you are implementing them. So if you are 
not developing the policies for the next term and the term after that you are not 
doing the work for the next period. 
What are the biggest challenges to good policy development? 
Steve Bracks: The biggest barrier to developing good policy is just political will. 
You can always get the people, you can always get the structure. But it is political 
will that is crucial, the determination to succeed. You need to believe that it is 
important and you have to be able to convince your colleagues that it is important 
and you have to be able to articulate it well.
Sufficient political will overcomes all the other deficiencies.  
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Could you elaborate? From a naïve perspective, you would assume that 
political will is a cornerstone of the reason parties exist. Are you referring to 
something specific? 
Steve Bracks: There is political will to pursue the platform that the party was 
elected on. But the need to continue to win can subvert good policy development 
by reducing government to the lowest common denominator. That is a feature of 
what has happened around the country at the moment. 
So there is a desire to win and then there is a misreading of what winning means. 
At the moment, winning is perceived as winning the daily argument. This is 
irrelevant. 
Persuading and arguing a case that may not be popular now can win you much 
more dividends than simply wining the day’s battle. But we have been reduced 
to largely winning the days battles, not arguing and persuading on a position that 
can win you significant benefit in the longer term. 
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This is an excerpt of an interview with Dr Allan Hawke 
AC, former senior public servant, conducted by CEDA 
in May 2013. 
Case Study 6 
Allan Hawke 
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Would you generally agree with CEDA members there’s been a decline in the 
quality of public policy debate? If so, why do you think it is the case?
Allan Hawke: I do agree with that, and there are a number of reasons behind 
it. The primary reason in the contemporary era is because of a lack of biparti-
san support for reform that existed at the time when major reforms were made 
in Australia that everybody now benefits from. At that time major reform issues 
where not subject to debate in the public arena where vested interest groups 
could do their level best to bring whatever it was unstuck. Now, the problem with 
the current minority government is that, even people who have articulated par-
ticular policy positions in the past, have opposed it when it was proposed. So, for 
instance, when some members of the Abbott opposition were in government and 
they articulated a whole series of policy proposals, when those proposals were 
put forward by the Gillard minority government, they opposed each and every 
one of them. That’s led to this dreadful deadlock in Canberra in terms of policy 
reform.
The issue of leadership is an important one for reform. What are the most suc-
cessful characteristics of a political leader that can help drive that process?
Allan Hawke: It is leaders – in particular, prime ministers – who have a political 
frame of reference around which they judge initiatives and the events of the day, 
and they’ve always got that framework to work from. Paul Keating was about a 
vision for Australia, within Australia and in Asia, security with Asia, not from Asia.
John Howard walked away from “the vision thing”, because, by the time he won 
election, Keating’s political standing was in disarray in Australia and the people 
had had enough of his vision. Yet, while Howard eschewed the ‘vision’ word, he 
actually had one. He used a series of what were called headland speeches – a 
different terminology to get around that issue. In each headland speech he would 
articulate a reform proposal and argue it with whoever over the course of the day 
in order to come to a position that was saleable through the Parliament and with 
the Australian people.
Dr Allan Hawke joined the Commonwealth Public Service in 1974 and has held senior 
positions including Deputy Secretary in Defence and Prime Minister and Cabinet, Chief of 
Staff to Prime Minister Paul Keating and Secretary of Veterans’ Affairs, Transport and 
Regional Services, and Defence and High Commissioner to New Zealand.
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How do you get that balance as a leader, or as part of a government, in influ-
encing versus reflecting what public opinion might think is important?
Allan Hawke: There are a number of issues here. First of all, Bob Hawke was 
renowned, and deservedly so, for being the Chairman of the Board. He was very 
consultative, he had views, but his views could be moderated by the view of the 
Cabinet at the time. In the best days of Keating, he led the discussion and often 
generated the ideas, and could usually convince his Cabinet and his party room 
to go with this, or he moderated those views depending on what was happening. 
Keating and Howard did use their authority on occasions to insist their position 
be adopted usually to good policy and political effect.
The elephant in the room is the rise in the numbers and the influence of the private 
office compared to the public service. Particular ministers have said from time to 
time: “We don’t need the department to generate policy ideas, we will do that 
ourselves. The public service is simply there to implement and execute the deci-
sions of the government of the day.”
Is that something that is more prevalent within a modern government than a 
few decades ago?
Allan Hawke: Yes, the power of advisers and the private office escalated in the 
latter years of the Howard era and became even more entrenched under Rudd, 
to the extent that it’s now accepted as the way of doing things.
It brings into question how the public service can play that role of influencing, 
against simply implementing policies that the government might want to have 
implemented. What are your thoughts on that?
Allan Hawke: The work that Ken Henry and Treasury did on the Inter-Generational 
Report, tax package and the Asian Century will be reference documents; for the 
next 10–12 years people will be dipping into those documents and pulling out 
policy proposals and turning them into an idea whose time has come. Treasury’s 
scenario planning certainly helped the Rudd government ameliorate the impact of 
the GFC on Australia. I could point to other examples, but it’s really matter for the 
public service to take opportunities to innovate and propose policy options to the 
Government of the day. Most of the problems in recent times have stemmed from 
execution of policies.
The public service has a role to play in developing substantive reform propos-
als, do they not?
Allan Hawke: That’s right. Let me give you what I think is the best example during 
my time of how you go about this. In 1996 when the Howard Government came 
to office, I became Secretary of Transport and Regional Services with John Sharp 
as the new minister. We sat down and went through every single one of the 
Coalition’s transport, regional service and infrastructure policies. And we decided 
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in one or two instances that maybe that policy that looked so good in opposition 
wouldn’t serve so well now that they were in office. We assigned each of the 
initiatives to an advisor in the office and to a named individual in the department. 
They had a timeframe within which to report to the Minister on the policy and the 
plans for implementation and we monitored and reported progress against all that. 
That worked absolutely brilliantly in building trust and executing the Government’s 
policy platform.
It’s often been suggested that the big reforms that were required for Australia 
have pretty much been done, and those that are left are perceived to be politi-
cally unpalatable. Is that more to do with leadership style than anything else?
Allan Hawke: It’s to do with having the courage of your convictions.  Paul Keating 
on Mabo or John Howard on the guns legislation, or even when he was arguing 
for the GST; these were not uniformly popular measures. They stood up and 
argued those positions. Howard even went to an election on the GST and won 
it – a major reform and a good one, because it taxes consumption.
You have to think through and really explain why you’ve come to a particular 
conclusion and what the rationale for it is. If you can’t do that, then you need to 
re-think very seriously the proposed reform. 
The big problem facing Australia now is the break down in the bi-partisan 
approach to reform which served us so well over the years, meaning that the 
argument wasn’t dependent on the public arena. The oppose everything mentality 
leaves us exposed to the vicissitudes of the minor parties and the anti-whatever 
campaigns. Major policy debates now seem to be won or lost in the media. 
Mitch Hooke, CEO of the Minerals Council of Australia captured it nicely “… the 
new paradigm is one of public contest through the popular media more so than 
rational, effective, considered debate and consultation”. I put it to you that the 
industry associations, Business Council of Australia and other bodies and people 
concerned about Australia’s future need to contemplate what to do about this 
sorry state of affairs.
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This is an excerpt of an interview with Dr Ken Henry 
AC, former senior public servant, conducted by CEDA 
in May, 2013. 
Case Study 7 
Ken Henry  
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CEDA members believe that there is a decline in the quality of public policy 
debate. Do you agree? 
Ken Henry: Well, I certainly agree with it. In fact, I can’t remember a time in the 
past 30 years when the quality of public policy debate has been so poor. I think 
there’s a whole range of reasons for it. Some of them are really intractable; others 
I think we can do something about. 
One thing that’s clear is that the media’s behaviour has changed. There’s more 
media. There are more people employed in the media and there’s not everywhere 
a depth of experience. We’ve got a 24/7 news cycle, and there’s an expectation 
on journalists that they will produce product to fill that 24/7 cycle. 
Another part of it, of course, is that politicians – most of them – can’t resist the 
opportunity to proffer a view in the media. Many of our politicians appear in front 
of the media several times a day. It’s very unlikely that they’re going to have had 
the time between interviews to develop well-constructed thoughts about issues, 
even issues of the day. Where is the time that is left to them, to construct well 
developed thoughts about the issues of tomorrow, the longer term issues? And 
that’s what they really should be thinking about. 
The third thing that I’d point to and that could well be intractable – is that, in public 
policy, we find ourselves dealing with very complex issues, and often having to 
deal with very complex issues in a very short space of time. If the issues have 
not been anticipated, then there’s been no opportunity to engage with the public 
on those issues. There’s been no opportunity for the public to get across what 
the possible solutions to the issues might be. On very complex topics in the past 
few years in Australia, policy pronouncements from government have been made 
that have really caught the public by surprise. And when the public is caught by 
surprise there’s an opportunity for vested interest to have a strong influence on 
the public perception of the policy proposal. And it’s very easy for even a well 
thought out, a well-considered, well-constructed policy proposal to be defeated 
by a rather shallow attack, because the shallow attack is all that the public is 
capable of understanding. 
Now, whether that issue that set of issues is tractable or not, I’m not sure. I’d like 
to think that we can do better in tackling the third of those issues that I mentioned 
– the complexity of the issues that we’re confronting. But, against that, I see no 
end of increasing complexity in the policy issues confronting government.
Dr Ken Henry is Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, leading the development of a White 
Paper on Australia in the Asian Century. For a decade commencing in April 2001 he was 
Secretary to the Treasury, a member of the Board of the Reserve Bank of Australia and a 
member of the Board of Taxation.  
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Could you talk about the qualities of leadership that are necessary in a 
politician? 
Ken Henry: There are two key things. The first is that the political leader is moti-
vated by something more than simply being in power, something more than simply 
being the country’s spokesman, something more than seeing themselves on the 
front page of the newspaper on a regular basis. There has to be something that is 
foundational, that motivates them to be a leader in the political sphere. That’s the 
first thing. 
The second thing is probably even more important – certainly more important 
when it comes to effectiveness – and that is the ability to communicate the need 
for things to be done, and the ability to persuade people of that need, and adduce 
it in the way you introduce the question; the ability to bring the public along with 
them in terms that the public can understand. Communication is the most impor-
tant quality of a good political leader.
How do you get that balance as a leader between influencing and reflecting 
public opinion and what the public is likely to accept?
Ken Henry: We live in a democracy. What that means is the best political leaders 
I’ve observed like to be just in front of where they think public opinion could pos-
sibly move to. But if they think there’s a possibility of moving public opinion in that 
direction, they’ll get out in front of it.
Some have been pretty successful by being just behind where public opinion is, 
but nevertheless nudging it in a particular direction. So what I’m saying is there 
is balance involved in this. The principal role is, though, for the leader to identify 
where the challenges are for the country, to articulate a strategic approach to 
addressing those challenges, and to put that to the public, and to convince the 
public that that is indeed the way that the country should move, rather than simply 
sit back and attend to issues on a day to day basis that arise in really unguided 
public discourse on issues. 
So, a leader who is preoccupied with following public opinion is, of course, not 
really going to offer any leadership at all. 
Where does the public service fit within that process you’ve explained? I mean, 
do they influence or merely implement government policy? 
Ken Henry: This is a contested space. I have strong views on this, but I respect 
the fact that some of my former colleagues would have different views. Some of 
my former colleagues I know feel very strongly that policy ideas are what should 
be expected of politicians rather than public servants, and public servants should 
be implementers, administrators. I understand that view, I respect it, but I disagree 
with it. In my own case, I wouldn’t have found that sufficiently motivating to have 
spent 30 years in the public service had that been the totality of the expectations 
of me. 
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But there’s another reason why I think it is important that the public service be 
more ambitious than that, and that is that the public service is better placed than 
politicians to, over a long period of time, take views or develop views on both 
long term challenges and policy approaches. A politician elected to government 
might have two and a half years, maybe three years. When coming into govern-
ment they may well have some very strong policy ideas. Five years to six years 
down the track they’ve probably exhausted all of their policy ideas. Then there’s 
an opportunity for the public servants who have thought deeply about the issues 
to help in the formulation of a policy agenda for the government. I don’t think 
that’s inappropriate at all. I think it’s entirely appropriate that the government look 
to the public service for assistance in the formulation of the government’s own 
policy agenda. 
Just to make this a little more concrete, reflecting on Australia’s response to the 
global financial crisis, imagine the position that we would have been in had the 
Treasury and other advisors not war gamed – and that’s what we did, war gamed 
– those sorts of economic shocks to the Australian economy and the sorts of 
responses that might be required. There was nothing that emerged in the global 
financial crisis that we had not thought through years before and were able to 
offer advice on. 
The proposition that we should leave all of that to politicians and simply imple-
ment whatever ideas they have in the moment is, in my view inappropriate. 
Some people suggest that the reason so much reform was instigated in the 
80s and 90s was because of the clear need to do so. 
Ken Henry: I think that it’s not necessary that you have a burning platform in 
order to motivate action. There are other ways of motivating action. It is possible 
to do so. I just think that in recent times we haven’t spent enough time investing 
in what is required to motivate substantial policy action. 
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This is an excerpt of an interview with Terry Moran 
AC, former senior public servant, conducted by CEDA 
in May, 2013. 
Case Study 8 
Terry Moran  
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terry Moran Ac has worked with successive Australian federal and state governments in 
public policy and public sector management. From March 2008 to September 2011 he was 
Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Prior to that, from 2000, he 
was Secretary of the Department of Premier and Cabinet in Victoria. He is National President 
of the Institute of Public Administration Australia and a Professorial Fellow at Monash 
University.
Terry Moran: I would argue that the last five years is notable for a large number 
of successful public policy initiatives, but also more than the usual number of fail-
ures. It’s the failures that have stigmatised the current government and perhaps 
prompted the view that somehow nothing’s been happening. 
So do you feel that it’s the electoral mandate that’s important because of the 
level of debate that focuses on the issues?
Terry Moran: No. I’m saying you can do reform without an electoral mandate but 
it takes a lot of work to explain to the public what the problem is, why something 
needs to be done and what the government will do. And it’s deficiencies in that 
latter area that surround many of the reforms introduced by government in the 
last five years.
I get very worried about how many CEOs of big corporations just assume that 
through an exercise of authority, government can mandate major reforms. The 
reality is in a parliamentary democracy, whether you’re a minority or majority gov-
ernment, you’ve got to take the people with you. You’ve got to have informed 
consent from a fair proportion of the population. That goes to two things – the 
quality of the political skills that government leadership has at a particular point in 
time and more broadly, to whether or not government leadership is effective in the 
‘art of governing’, as I would call it.
Would you elaborate on that?
Terry Moran: Firstly, if you want to do something, then everything that I’ve said 
before about political management and communications applies. Secondly, the 
government needs to be effectively working with the major stakeholder groups 
who are affected. Thirdly, where the states and territories are involved, they 
should not be approached with antagonism but with a degree of respect for their 
constitutional role and what they’ve got to do. And then finally, government has to 
have a very clear idea about what the public service does and what ministers and 
their private officers do. They have to let the public service do its job and have 
ministers and their political advisors do theirs.
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We have a particular Australian problem at the moment. It is not universal but it 
is more common than was previously the case. The problem goes to the rela-
tionship between some ministers and the public service. Some ministers would 
do better to trust the public service rather than assume the worst of the public 
servants they work with. Most importantly of all, this applies where ministers or 
their political advisers don’t like particular pieces of advice from the public service. 
A little more curiosity in exploring the unexpected or the challenging is needed for 
our system to work well in the broader national interest. 
We also have a major problem with a few ministerial advisors who have free-
lanced on quite a number of big issues rather than working in a professional way 
with the public service. The political advisors should do their main job – to handle 
the politics – and leave the public servants able to provide honest and uncon-
strained policy advice. 
Do you think the role of political advisors has changed over time?
Terry Moran: Yes, it has. Until the end of the Howard Government, a minister’s 
office would be a mixture of seconded senior public servants who knew about 
the business of government and also public policy, as well as experienced 
political and media advisors. In recent years we have come to accept, without 
comment, a system with hardly any senior public servants in ministerial offices. 
Thus ministers often lack, close at hand, compatible professional people with 
the background to help them deal with the business of government and public 
policy. This means a lot of the load has often fallen to people with no experience 
or insufficient experience of actually being in government, rather than handling 
media relations or managing stakeholders in a political sense. There have been a 
lot of miscalculations along the way.
The consequence is that governments end up being destined to relatively short 
terms because they don’t have the right sort of governing skills that go to political 
management and communications. 
Steve Bracks said that policy setting is an ongoing process, vital for maintain-
ing government.
Terry Moran: That’s right. I worked with Steve Bracks and as premier he was 
meticulous in saying he wanted the advice of the public service on professional 
public policy grounds and he wanted his private office to give him political advice 
on top of that. He didn’t want his private office to try and redo the policy advice 
from the public service. A similar set of assumptions also applied under Jeff 
Kennett and John Brumby when they were premiers. Under both sides of politics 
in Victoria and for more than two decades, a bi-partisan agreement existed as to 
how ministers and public servants worked together professionally. It amounted 
to a sensible expression of the Australian Westminster system and underwrote 
economic success for the state
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And why did that arise?
Terry Moran: Maturity on the part of leadership on both sides of politics. But 
also because of what I’ve been saying. Both sides understood that they had to 
prepare the electorate for some policies before they got into office and then they 
were faithful in implementing them. If they had to do new things, because circum-
stances changed, then they took particular care to explain to the population what 
the problem was, why they were doing it, and what it would mean.
That leads to a question: what is the role of public servants in actually influenc-
ing versus implementing public policy?
Terry Moran: Government is now so complex that no minister can have the tech-
nical ability or the insight to come up with a big tax reform package or come 
up with a way that will work so that you reform public hospitals. It’s easier for 
a minister just to decide to spend X billions of dollars to increase the rate of a 
particular pension. But when you’re talking about the big systems that govern-
ments operate to do things or deliver services – whether it’s defence or the health 
system or education – these things are so complex that they need professional 
advice.
There’s been quite a bit of observation around the change in media cycle 
as being something that is making it more difficult to successfully introduce 
and prosecute reforms, partly because those people, who are influenced and 
affected by them, can rapidly be marshalled and it makes it more difficult for a 
government to get through that. Do you think that’s a valid observation?
Terry Moran: When you look around Australia at the moment, there are political 
leaders who are very successful in managing the media while still doing substan-
tial reforms – Barry O’Farrell in New South Wales and Colin Barnett in Western 
Australia come to mind. They have proved to be adept at the art of governing and 
“touch the ground” in their understanding of their communities.
In government, forward momentum on policy provides an ability to set the 
agenda. Those policies which have been well-developed, well-worked through 
with effected groups and carefully planned before implementation are highly likely 
to work over time. This can change relationships with the media. But if you’re 
fretting all the time about today or tomorrow’s tabloid front page and how to skew 
it towards your perspective, then government becomes a pawn in the hands of 
people in the media and their view of what is important.
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